# Aff Answers

## Uniqueness Answers

### China Losing

#### China’s authoritarian ascendence will cause its downfall – the US will outcompete

Kroenig ‘20 (Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, and the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China,” The Atlantic, 4/3/2020, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/why-china-ill-equipped-great-power-rivalry/609364/)-> MP

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the [United States built](https://www.amazon.com/Present-Creation-Years-State-Department/dp/0393304124) the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt [recently wrote](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/opinion/sunday/china-economy-trade.html) in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many [economists predict](https://www.newsweek.com/worlds-largest-economy-2030-will-be-china-followed-india-us-pushed-third-1286525) that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and [some have suggested](http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2043235,00.html) that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao [aligned with the Soviet Union in 1950](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18011.shtml) only to nearly [fight a nuclear war](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/index2.html) with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and [“hiding its capabilities and biding its time”](https://www.ft.com/content/05cd86a6-b552-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399) abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. [According to the Asia Society](https://aspi.gistapp.com/winter-2020/page/overview), he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, [taking contested territory](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/world/asia/south-china-seas-photos.html) from neighbors in the South China Sea and [conducting military exercises](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html) with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The [2017 U.S. National Security Strategy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf) declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000 [years of history](https://camphorpress.com/5000-years-of-history/)” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the [protests this year in Hong Kong](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49317695) and Xinjiang—the CCP [spends more on domestic security](https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-spends-more-on-domestic-security-as-xis-powers-grow-1520358522) than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. [Shadi Hamid: China Is Avoiding Blame by Trolling the World](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/china-trolling-world-and-avoiding-blame/608332/) Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including [North Macedonia this week](https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/04/02/world/europe/02reuters-nato-northmacedonia.html). The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of [lauding autocratic China’s firm response](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/world/asia/coronavirus-china-united-states.html) in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually [misrepresented](https://time.com/5813628/china-coronavirus-statistics-wuhan/) the numbers of COVID-19 infections and [deaths](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-27/stacks-of-urns-in-wuhan-prompt-new-questions-of-virus-s-toll) in China, and European nations have [rejected](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52092395) and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits. The great political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli considered a similar line of thinking in the 16th century, about whether republics or dictators charted a more stable course. He wrote, “I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable … The prince … unchecked by laws, will be more … unstable, and imprudent than a populace.” The U.S. political system certainly has problems. But democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous power, wealth, and prestige on the international stage.

### China Econ Declining

**China’s economy declining – markets plummeting, rising risk of recession, and GDP decline**

**He ‘22** {Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, 5-5-2022, CNN, "China's economy is going backwards ", https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/economy/china-economy-services-decline-covid-intl-hnk/index.html]//PJ

China's gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%.

#### China is in a recession – econ collapse is inevitable

He 22 (Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, based in Hong Kong. She covers news about Asian business and markets, with a focus on China, “China’s economy is going backwards,” CNN Business, 5/5/2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/economy/china-economy-services-decline-covid-intl-hnk/index.html>) - MP

China’s gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%. In recent days, Chinese leaders have repeatedly tried to reassure the public about fixing the economy. President Xi Jinping last week called for an infrastructure spending spree to promote growth. And the Communist Party's Politburo on Friday promised "specific measures" to support the internet economy.

#### Chinese economy collapse is coming – Ukraine conflict and lockdowns causes economic downturn.

Chen 22 (Yawen Chen is in Beijing, crunching economic data, interviewing high-level officials, and travelling to far-flung provinces to visit factory floors and talk to local shopkeepers, “China is at risk of self-inflicted recession,” Reuters, 4/12/2022, <https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/china-is-risk-self-inflicted-recession-2022-04-13/>) - MP

China’s stubborn battle to eradicate Omicron is raising the risk of a serious economic crisis. Nearly one-third of the population is under some sort of lockdown, with shops shut and factories struggling. Policy easing looks unavoidable, but with benchmark yields dropping below U.S. Treasury bonds, so does capital flight. The outbreak in Shanghai, where asymptomatic cases are running at around 25,000 a day despite two weeks of rigorous lockdown, is prompting other regions to impose draconian measures pre-emptively. At least 373 million people in cities contributing to 40% of China’s GDP have been affected, a Nomura survey showed. Key indicators are already reflecting the shock. Domestic sales of passenger cars fell over 10% in March, per official data; an index tracking freight traffic in China dropped by about 25% during the first week of April. China contained the initial outbreak in 2020 quickly and resumed production, allowing its manufacturing sector to tap export markets to revive growth after a single quarter of contraction. Omicron is far more infectious, yet Beijing aims to reproduce that result. Officials appear to be realising that won’t be easy. With the war in Ukraine pushing up commodities costs, and demand for Chinese exports cooling as inflation spikes in key overseas markets, premier Li Keqiang this week warned of “unexpected changes” in the external and domestic environment that would require more urgent, aggressive measures. Fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending will be hard to implement during lockdowns, which leaves monetary policy. Cutting interest rates and reserve ratios, however, is tricky given the increasingly hawkish U.S. Federal Reserve. Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on Monday; local inflation rates are still lower but rising quickly. If sharp currency depreciation ensues, Beijing might face a repeat of the capital outflows it struggled to contain in 2015. There are already signs foreign investors are evacuating. For private businesses, uncertainty as to when lockdowns will end, and whether they will resume soon after, will deter investment and job creation regardless of the cost of credit. Consumers rushing to hoard food before they get sealed inside their flats are unlikely to spend on other goods. The longer Beijing digs its heels on zero Covid, the closer a recession will get. - At a forum held with local government officials on April 11, Premier Li Keqiang said the government must be vigilant against “unexpected changes” in the international and domestic environment that are putting downward pressure on the Chinese economy. Li urged officials to speed implementation of policy measures announced earlier in the year, ranging from tax cuts and special-purpose government bond issuance to ensuring stable energy supply. - Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on April 11, Reuters reported. - Chinese banks extended 3.1 trillion yuan ($490 billion) in new yuan loans in March, up sharply from February and exceeding analyst expectations, data released by the People's Bank of China on April 11 showed.

**China’ economy in freefall – mismanagement, COVID, and external factors make it damage beyond repair**

**Singleton ‘22** [Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat., 6-13-2022, Foreign Policy, "China's Crisis of Confidence", https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/13/china-xi-jinping-economy-downturn-slowdown-decline-geopolitics-competition-united-states/#:~:text=China's%20economy%2C%20long%20in%20decline,prolonged%20era%20of%20slow%20growth.]//PJ

What if the new era of great-power competition was over before it had even begun? Many of today’s fears about a multigeneration conflict with Beijing rest on linear extrapolations of yesteryear’s data, harkening back to a time when China appeared on track to supplant the United States as the world’s largest economy. Yet more and more signs point to a China that is fully unprepared for the competition with the United States it once sought. China’s economy, long in decline, is now in freefall—thanks to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s mismanagement. Case in point: This year, the U.S. economy is forecast to grow faster than China’s for the first time since 1976, with strong indications that China has entered a prolonged era of slow growth. More surprising is that Xi, in an attempt to stabilize China’s finances, has largely abandoned his ambitious plans to overhaul China’s growth model, choosing instead to double down on the very economic policies that got China into today’s economic bind in the first place. Put differently, Xi blinked. Xi’s reversal speaks volumes. It suggests he lacks confidence in his own plan to transform China’s unsustainable economic model into one that can deliver on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) promise of “high quality” growth. More important is that China’s fizzling economic miracle may soon undercut the CCP’s ability to wage a sustained struggle for geostrategic dominance. This raises a tantalizing question: What if, instead of being a competitor, China cannot actually afford to compete at all? Xi is often said to have tapped into Chinese resentment over its colonial-era humiliations to kick-start its modern-day competition with the United States. But the decision to jettison China’s policy of hiding its capabilities and biding its time began much earlier. Indeed, for decades before Xi’s ascent into power, CCP elites made clear this dictum would be discarded as soon as the international balance of power shifted in China’s favor. When Washington looked to be terminally weakened by the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese officials made their move, betting that overseas investments and economic coercion were the keys to outcompeting the West. They were mostly right. China’s economic clout, beyond any other consideration, still serves as the foundation for the country’s vast influence. The gravitational pull of China’s market, along with Beijing’s ability to influence economic conditions and shape political perceptions in other countries, enabled China to bind itself to the world. The fruits of China’s economic expansion also underwrote its power projection, covering the costs of the Belt and Road Initiative, military modernization, and expanding multilateral commitments. China’s GDP growth paid domestic dividends for the CCP too, empowering a model of state capitalism that broke down the barriers between the private sector and government institutions to mobilize the former in service of the latter. Nevertheless, China’s meteoric rise, fueled by annual GDP growth above 6 percent, appears over. Yes, China’s economy has been cooling for years, plagued by systematic deficiencies like chronic overinvestment, massive debt loads, and a shrinking workforce, which has put enormous stresses on China’s finances. But these systematic trends have been exacerbated, perhaps irreversibly, by China’s disastrous pandemic response, where the lack of an effective domestic vaccine and the CCP’s unwillingness to approve and purchase Western ones have made rolling lockdowns a permanent way of life. So far, the CCP’s containment measures have resulted in plummeting industrial output, surging unemployment, capital flight, and a sinking currency. Efforts to stabilize the Chinese economy will be further strained by a deteriorating external environment, with the World Bank warning of 1970s-style stagflation and reduced global demand for Chinese exports—until now, the engine of China’s growth. The economy remains severely dependent on vast supplies of imported fuel, grain, and other commodities whose prices have massively surged. Western technology transfer restrictions are also taking their toll. Another challenge is growing frustration in China’s largest markets—the United States and the European Union—over Xi’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Already, large multinational companies like Apple are shifting supply chains to Southeast Asia and other regions perceived as more stable while expatriates are abandoning the country and newly minted college graduates flee in droves. Indeed, China’s brain drain has begun. So far, Xi has offered few new ideas for remedying China’s crisis, even as his subordinates warn about the need to “act decisively” to avoid financial ruin. Xi’s big bet consists of an “all-out” infrastructure push to boost the economy—the same approach that fueled China’s current debt bubble, massive industrial overcapacity, and the creation of entire ghost cities of half-finished apartments. But such investments are unlikely to stimulate China’s economy, not least because they are focused on propping up the least productive parts of China’s economy, including the state sector. Making matters worse, Xi has offered little relief for Chinese consumers, the linchpin in his effort to drum up domestic consumption, decrease inequality, and reduce the economy’s reliance on exports and unproductive investments. Consumers were integral to China’s pandemic rebound in 2021 but now face growing fears about job security and sustained income losses from never-ending lockdowns. At the same time, one by one, Xi’s signature economic initiatives have disappeared from the front pages of China’s state-owned newspapers. That includes Xi’s push for “common prosperity,” which ostensibly aimed to reduce extreme inequality by giving ordinary Chinese a greater share of the nation’s wealth. Plans to introduce a property tax to slow down China’s notorious real estate bubble—where the elite have amassed vast fortunes—have also been shelved. Chinese regulators have also signaled an end to Xi’s crackdown on China’s tech giants, whose growing influence has long been viewed as a growing threat to the CCP’s power. Nevertheless, foreign investors, who lost billions of dollars on Chinese tech stocks tanked by Xi’s policies, remain wary. With many Western banks warning that the regulatory risks of investing in China now outweigh the potential benefits, these investors may not come to Beijing’s rescue either. Mere months before Xi’s coronation to a third term as party secretary, CCP officials whose jobs it is to worry about economic growth, like Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, are now openly pitted against Xi and those more concerned with regime security and party control, such as Chinese Vice Premiers Han Zheng and Hu Chunhua. While Xi projects calm and warns citizens not to question his zero-COVID policies, Li refuses to endorse them and instead speaks of China’s “complicated and grave” situation. This fractured policy environment, where ideological and technocratic factions battle for influence, is eerily reminiscent of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s era. Just as it did then, today’s intraparty clash will produce winners and losers. For now, the latter group includes Xi, who will probably be forced to make key personnel concessions during this fall’s 20th National Party Congress to secure the support needed to guarantee a third term. For the remainder of 2022, China’s worsening domestic challenges will remain the party’s highest priority, and addressing them will take up an increasing share of China’s economic resources. The upshot is that U.S.-China tensions will likely remain subdued, at least for the short-to-medium term. China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. More difficult to predict, however, is how China’s fight for resources and power will affect the country’s various domestic stakeholders. For the first time in a while, China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. As a result, funding trade-offs will be necessary, including those considered inconceivable when China’s annual growth hovers around 10 percent. That will include cuts to current and planned investments in China’s power projection capabilities, both civilian and military. Outbound Chinese development loans, a key tool for Beijing to expand relations across Asia and Africa, have already dropped 96 percent in recent years, from $75 billion in 2016 to approximately $4 billion during the pandemic. The overall average value of Belt and Road Initiative-related projects, averaging $255 billion annually between 2010 and 2019, also cratered to less than $81 billion in 2020. Although these figures may recover slightly, Chinese policymakers will be hard pressed to justify such expenditures as China’s economy falters. Similar trade-offs will also be necessary for certain aspects of China’s defense spending. In a contested resource environment, tensions will almost certainly emerge between China’s army, navy, and domestic security apparatus. The same goes for civil-military relations because local officials are often expected to provide the military with the materiel and support required for training and large-scale exercises. Overtime, China’s economic slowdown could also lead to civil unrest, which could force the military to become more involved in maintaining domestic security at the expense of its broader modernization. Potential economic constraints could also impede plans to fully fund newly announced ventures, such as China’s space force. Over the long term, China could be forced to choose among certain core missions, such as monitoring China’s coast, building up its South China Sea outposts, maintaining its air defense identification zone, and even protecting its unruly borders. Either way, China’s military will be forced to do more with less. In the end though, China’s sustained economic cooldown and Xi’s crisis of confidence will result in the very outcome he, the CCP, and Chinese nationalists feared most: broad recognition that China may be incapable of competing with the United States at all.

### China Hates NATO

#### China already hates NATO action

McCarthy 22[Simone McCarthy. China Writer for CNN Digital Worldwide, Previously South China Post, received Awards at WAN-IFRA, contributor to SupChina. "Analysis: Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy". 6-30-2022. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html. 7-2-2022.]-cg

As leaders of major Western democracies and their allies met in two back-to-back summits this week in Europe, their focus was clear: keeping pressure on Russia as its brutal assault on Ukraine enters its fifth month. But another country was also pulled into the spotlight in those meetings: China. And Beijing is not happy about it. For the first time, China was included in NATO's "Strategic Concept," adopted at the bloc's summit in Madrid on Wednesday. The document, last updated in 2010, lays out the security challenges facing the alliance while outlining a course of action, and now says China's ambitions and "coercive policies" challenge the allies' interests, security and values. The new language has prompted China to accuse NATO of being a "Cold War remnant." "The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world," China's Mission to the EU said in a statement Wednesday. "We urge NATO to stop provoking confrontation by drawing ideological lines, abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game approach, and stop spreading disinformation and provocative statements against China. Since NATO positions China as a "systemic challenge," we have to pay close attention and respond in a coordinated way," it said. Earlier this week, the Group of Seven (G7) major democratic economies included tough language on China in their own communique, released days after launching an infrastructure investment plan to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. European leaders have grown increasingly wary of China in recent years and those views have hardened over the past few months as Beijing has repeatedly refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bolstered its ties with the Kremlin. "We see a deepening strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. And China's growing assertiveness and its coercive policies have consequences for the security of Allies and our partners," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at a news conference Wednesday. "China is not our adversary. But we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents," he said. Differences still exist between countries in the bloc on how to treat China, observers say. Some NATO members want to ensure the focus remains squarely on Russia, while the United States -- by far the block's most powerful member -- has pegged China as the "most serious long-term challenge to the international order." But the developments this week, which show China to be higher on these bodies' agendas than ever before, signal an increasing alignment between the US and its partners. They also mark a significant setback for Beijing, which has tried to drive a wedge between the American and European stances on China, observers say. "The combination of the kind of language used by the G7 and (China's formal inclusion) in NATO strategic documents is indeed a blow for (China), and something that they would have hoped and wished to be able to prevent," said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow in the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States. "It's an exceptionally strong period in terms of transatlantic cooperation and that translates for China in ways that they're very concerned about," he said. China's concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. "China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a 'systemic challenge'?" ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. "We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China," he said, adding that NATO should "stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe." But that rhetoric -- blaming NATO for "disruption" in Europe -- is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China "very quickly and very clearly lined itself up -- at least in words, not so much in deeds -- with Russia," while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging "democracies versus autocracies" narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. "In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift," Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China's economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation's relations with Taiwan. That miscalculation was on show in a terse summit between China and European Union leaders in April, where China focused on talking points around deepening their relations and economic cooperation, while EU officials were bent on pushing China to work with it toward brokering peace in Ukraine. China has claimed neutrality and that it supports peace, but has made no concrete steps in that direction. Rising concerns about China from the G7 -- made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the US -- were reflected in the bloc's joint communique, released Tuesday after a summit in German Bavaria. The document, which mentioned China around a dozen times -- versus four references in the G7 leaders' statement a year earlier -- touched on areas of cooperation, but focused on calling on China to improve its human rights record and abide by international rules. And in a mark of how Russia has shaped the bloc's view on China, the group called on Beijing to "press" Moscow to comply with United Nations resolutions and stop its military aggression. The statement followed what Washington called the "formal launch" on Sunday of a $600 billion G7 infrastructure investment initiative, first announced last year. The drive, which the EU said would "demonstrate the power of development finance when it reflects democratic values," was an apparent bid to counter China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which critics say Beijing has used to build its global influence. At NATO, the newly adopted strategy document says China "employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up." It also points to a "deepening strategic partnership" between Russia and China and says their "mutually reinforcing attempts" to undercut the rules-based international order "run counter" to NATO values. The language, which also saw Russia move from a "strategic partner" in the 2010 document to "the most significant and direct threat" in the current iteration, is a clear bolstering of NATO's stance. That's significant not least of all because in recent years, as NATO statements began to reference China, some members and observers raised concerns that taking too firm a stance risked turning China into an enemy. Others have seen China as outside the region's key security interests. Following a NATO meeting last June, in which leaders characterized China as a security challenge, French President Emmanuel Macron downplayed the move with a quip that "China is not in the North Atlantic." Some of those concerns still exist, and inside the bloc there remain differences in views on how to handle China, observers say. Within Europe, such debates even extend to the emerging "autocracies versus democracies" narrative being promoted by the US, according to Pierre Haroche, a research fellow in European security at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris). "Do you want to solidify the 'dragon-bear monster' to show that there is a clear ideological 'Cold War' between democracies and autocracies, because that's convenient in terms of the narrative? Or is it (a better) strategy to say that the two (China and Russia) are very different actors ... who might even, in the future, oppose one another?" said Haroche, summarizing the argument. But even as differences may exist between member states, it's clear that NATO is thinking bigger at this year's summit, with the historic inclusion of leaders from New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. The move was met with ire in China, where officials have long argued that NATO was seeking to expand its presence into the Indo-Pacific, which Beijing views as its own neighborhood. "The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean - this should be the general consensus in the Asia-Pacific region," a Tuesday editorial from the Communist Party-affiliated nationalist tabloid Global Times said. But observers have characterized this not so much as an expansion of NATO into the Indo-Pacific, but rather a bid to strengthen relations between, in the NATO secretariat's words, "like-minded countries." Those democracies across the Pacific, like their counterparts in Europe, may now be seeing the threats they face as more connected, according to The German Marshall Fund's Small. "There is much more of a sense emerging from all of this, conditioned by the China challenge, by the Russia challenge, that the democratic allies have to be more effectively coordinated," he said.

### China Hege Decline Now

#### China in decline – US must maintain force and hege to contain aggressive and violent policies of China.

Brands ‘22 (Hal Brands. Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. "The Dangers of China's Decline as a Great Power". April 14, 2022. Foreign Policy. https://archive.ph/1Rt7v. 7-1-2022.)-cg

Decline is a tricky concept. The term makes us think of a country that is falling like a rock—one whose power and capabilities are dropping across the board. But a country can be in relative decline vis-à-vis a fast-growing adversary even if its own power is still increasing. It can be surging forward in some areas, such as military might, even as its underlying economic strength starts to wither. And decline doesn’t always lead a country to scale back its objectives—the sense of urgency it creates can cause ambitious powers to grab what they can before the clock runs out. Xi Jinping’s China is about to give the world an education in the nuances of decline. Since the onset of its economic reforms in the 1970s, China has long defied predictions that it would soon stumble or collapse. Its spectacular growth challenged prevailing views about the sources of national success in the modern world. In some ways, China is still soaring: Its military power grows more formidable every year. When Xi declares that “the East is rising and the West is declining,” he gives voice to this sense that China is a country on the make. Yet military power is often a lagging indicator of a country’s trajectory: It takes time to turn money into military muscle, and massive buildups often persist even after a country’s economic fortunes begin to flag. And today, for reasons including demographic disaster and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is facing the end of the stunning economic growth that made it possible for Xi to assert that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” was at hand. The China of the 2020s will be a country whose coercive capabilities are more intimidating than ever as its economic dynamism fades. That could be the worst possible combination for the world. Any country that rises as impressively as China is bound to make fools of some prophets of decline along the way. In recent decades, Beijing has repeatedly confounded those who predicted it was about to hit the wall. In the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s death, some Western observers were skeptical that China—a country that U.S. diplomat George Kennan once called a “vast poorhouse”—could put together the policies necessary for sustained growth. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it was common to wonder whether the resulting political crackdown would stifle the country’s prosperity. Through the early 2000s, social scientists and U.S. officials predicted that China could be rich or autocratic—but not both. A few prominent analysts made careers for themselves by heralding China’s collapse. It hasn’t happened—yet. From 1978 to the onset of the global financial crisis three decades later, China’s constant-dollar GDP grew by a factor of 17, without the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) losing control. That growth enabled the decades-long military buildup and sprawling economic influence that made China a force to be feared on the global stage. As Tufts University’s Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China, this economic miracle required good luck and good policy. China seemed to have hit the demographic jackpot in the 1980s and 1990s; the unlikely combination of warfare and famine in the 1930s and 1940s, a regime-sponsored baby boom after the CCP took power, and then the institution of the one-child policy in 1980 left the country with a huge working-age population unencumbered by lots of young or old dependents. China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and other resources. And it had the fortuitous timing to start its reforms as globalization went into overdrive, making it easier to integrate the country into complex supply chains and thereby make China the workshop of the world. Good policies were also crucial. Mao’s one-man rule and economic illiteracy had condemned China to serial, self-created disasters. Once he died, Deng Xiaoping and his successors moved toward a “socialist market economy.” They opened China to trade and investment, overhauled the tax and regulatory systems, shrank bloated state-owned enterprises, and encouraged private business. Accompanying political reforms limited the power of China’s rulers and enlarged the space for nonideological competence within the regime. The CCP relaxed its grip enough to permit economic spontaneity—and reaped the benefits in the form of prosperity that reinforced its political control. China’s ascendance shook the world intellectually as well as geopolitically: It undermined post-Cold War Western beliefs that prosperity would lead inevitably to political liberalization, that democracies produced higher rates of growth than autocracies, and that tyranny was incompatible with sound economic management. As China became a global heavyweight, a new orthodoxy solidified—that a hegemonic transition was approaching as Beijing surpassed the United States. One dissenter was the political scientist David Shambaugh. In 2015, Shambaugh argued that China was suffering from a deep internal malaise and that Xi’s increasingly repressive rule was a sign of insecurity, not confidence. “[F]or all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut,” he wrote, China’s economy “is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh struck a discordant note at a time when Beijing was tightening its control of the South China Sea and spreading its influence across multiple continents. He also happened to be right. Not least of the oddities surrounding contemporary China is that much of the world deemed its ascent inevitable just as its prospects started to dim. This may sound absurd, given all the hype surrounding China’s rise. After all, that country is supposedly destined, as the Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison (channeling legendary Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) has written, to become “the biggest player in the history of the world.” It’s true that China does boast many apparent advantages. It has an enormous domestic market and is the leading trade partner of roughly 130 countries around the world. It is making concerted investments in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and other critical technologies. If the United States doesn’t up its game, a national commission chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in 2021, China could become the premier “AI superpower.” But look closer, and China’s trajectory starts to seem more tenuous. For one thing, many of China’s technological achievements are narrower and less impressive than they first appear. For example, Beijing has made great strides in AI applications focused on surveillance (no surprise there), but the United States still leads significantly across the wider expanse of AI subfields and uses. Despite vast state subsidies, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. is years behind in the creation of cutting-edge semiconductors that make up the foundation of advanced economies in the information age. Just this year, Peking University published a candid assessment—which the CCP then predictably censored—of China’s progress in science and technology. The verdict was that China is “following [the United States] in most fields, running side by side in a few, and leading in very few.” And while China’s other strengths are not illusory, neither can they hide a reality that Beckley and I discussed last year: The magic that made China’s economic miracle is unmistakably fizzling. The country’s resource abundance is old news: Overuse devastated much of China’s arable land; industrialization and pollution left the country with severe water scarcity. More damaging still, China’s abundance of human resources is also a thing of the past. The one-child policy was a devil’s bargain that is now causing demographic implosion. China’s total population is set to peak by 2028 (or perhaps as soon as this year, by some estimates) and then plummet by as much as half by century’s end. Its working population crested in 2015; it will fall by 70 million between 2020 and 2035 and even faster after that. China will soon combine an enormous geriatric population with a rapidly shrinking workforce. It will experience one of the worst peacetime demographic crunches on record, a formula for stagnation at best and catastrophic economic contraction at worst. Making matters worse, the era of enlightened economic policy is over. The reform agenda has been stalled for more than a decade because further liberalization—necessary to make the leap to a more innovative, knowledge-based economy—would threaten the privileges of entrenched elites. If anything, Xi has thrown the country into reverse. Politically, he is taking China into neototalitarianism through pervasive repression and indoctrination. And economically, his policies have a decidedly retrograde feel. Xi’s agenda has featured a preference for state-owned enterprises at the expense of the more vibrant private sector; the imposition of severe, politically motivated restrictions on wide swaths of the economy; attacks on the autonomy of relatively technocratic institutions such as the central bank; and the empowerment of political minders in companies of nearly all sizes. China’s leaders may talk about the need to transition to a high-tech, services-based economy, but Xi’s policies are stifling the competence, creativity, and spontaneity necessary to make that shift. It all constitutes a “great leap backward”—a reversion to pre-Deng-era policies that condemned China to stagnation. There is also the question of what Xi’s consolidation of power means for the country’s long-term resilience. As the political theorist Francis Fukuyama has written, for nearly 40 years after Mao’s death China avoided the “bad emperor” problem—the worst pathologies that accompany authoritarian rule—by imposing term limits on its rulers and making them more accountable to other CCP elites. Yet Xi has systematically disassembled this system by purging rivals, sidelining potential successors, and entrenching himself in power. By doing so, he is enabling China to move faster and more decisively. But he is also leaving the country vulnerable to impulsive or unwise decision-making—a perpetual problem of one-man rule—and creating the potential for terrible instability when his reign finally ends. Xi’s centralization of authority, while seemingly impressive, is setting the country up for a fall. Finally, it doesn’t help that a more assertive China is now facing more international resistance. Trade barriers against Chinese companies and products proliferated in the decade after the global financial crisis. Washington has waged a technological cold war against Huawei, seeking to deprive that Chinese firm of high-end semiconductors and keep it out of the world’s 5G networks. Dozens of countries are more carefully scrutinizing their economic, financial, and technological ties with Beijing; the Japanese government is offering to pay companies to reduce their China exposure. China is still central to the global economy, but the days when the United States and other powerful countries eagerly abetted its ascent are over. Indeed, Xi’s effort to cultivate the domestic market is an implicit admission that China, which rose on the strength of an export-focused economy, now confronts a very different world. China’s predicament has been thrown into relief, ironically, by COVID-19. Early on, the pandemic seemed to herald an epochal global shift. Prominent U.S. analysts saw it as a “Suez moment,” the terminal crisis of the U.S. empire. Xi touted his regime’s success in containing COVID-19 at home (albeit after allowing it to escape to the world) as an advertisement for Chinese authoritarianism. Two years later, it’s clear that COVID-19 was a turning point but not in the way that Xi hoped. The pandemic hypercharged global anti-China sentiment, after Beijing concealed the initial outbreak and then exploited the resulting chaos to bully nations from Australia to Germany and the United Kingdom. It thereby encouraged a host of efforts—through multilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, and the G-7, as well as the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Pacific—to counter Chinese power. “A Cold War mentality” had reemerged, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry complained, as the United States and its friends pursued “anti-China encirclement.” COVID-19 also confirmed how patchy China’s rise had been: The country’s biotechnology sector couldn’t produce anything like the revolutionary vaccines that democratic innovation economies in the United States and Europe churned out. Even China’s heavy-handed success in containing COVID-19 at home became a trap: The combination of “zero-COVID” policies, low levels of natural immunity, and vaccines that proved weak or worthless against highly contagious variants condemned the country to recurring lockdowns of major cities, with all the accompanying disruptions. Even before COVID-19, in fact, China’s economic vital signs were worrying. The government claimed a growth rate of 6 percent, but Chinese insiders and academic research indicate that the true number is considerably lower—and even that growth is inflated by the relentless injection of capital into a less and less efficient economy. As a result, overall debt grew eightfold between 2008 and the end of 2020, reaching 335 percent of GDP. In other countries, this combination of slumping productivity and growing debt usually presages sharp crises that turn into lasting economic quagmires. Xi’s Chinese dream involves catching up to the United States. In reality, his country is slowing down. China is not, however, slowing down in all areas at once. This isn’t unusual: The Soviet Union hit the apex of its military power in the 1980s, when its economy was in a death spiral. In the early 20th century, Britain ruled a global empire at a time when its economic supremacy had already slipped away. Today, China is stagnating economically, but its drive for world power is accelerating. Chinese leaders and propaganda organs now openly tout the country’s designs: In the coming decades, the official state news agency Xinhua proclaimed, China will “re-ascend to the top of the world.” Beijing is creating new international organizations and co-opting others. Its marquee projects, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road, aim to project economic and political influence across Eurasia and beyond. China also fashions itself as an ideological role model for other countries: Its style of governance, Xi has said, offers a “new option for other countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” Most notably, China is building and wielding the tools of geopolitical coercion. Countries such as Australia, Lithuania, Norway, and South Korea have felt China’s economic bite after they opposed its policies or criticized its internal practices. Chinese military spending—having already grown tenfold in real terms between 1990 and 2016—continues to rise, funding a dramatic expansion of the capabilities needed to conquer Taiwan, overawe Beijing’s neighbors, and perhaps even take on the United States in the Western Pacific. The statistics are simply astounding: Beijing put as many ships to sea from 2014 to 2018 as were in the navies of Britain, Germany, India, Spain, and Taiwan combined. And having long avoided a nuclear arms race with Washington, Beijing is now sprinting forward and could be the United States’ nuclear peer by the 2030s. Threats to use force against enemies have also become ubiquitous: Anyone who obstructs China’s plans, Xi warned in 2021, will “have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel.” It is sometimes hard to believe that such a country is running out of gas. But perhaps China’s strategic urgency is increasing because its economic outlook has turned grim. China’s “hide and bide” strategy—the approach it followed for a generation under Deng and after—was one of patient confidence. If time was on a rising Beijing’s side, then it made sense to gradually build the country’s power and delay confrontation with the United States. Today, China’s strategic mindset is darker and more insistent. In many areas, Xi acknowledges, “the West is strong, and the East is weak.” China must race to make itself “invincible” so that “nobody can beat us or choke us to death.” What the United States will face in this decade, then, is a China whose ability to batter its enemies and challenge the global order is growing, even as leaner economic times loom ahead. This China is unlikely to be benign or peaceful. History has seen many once ascendant countries lash out violently rather than accept a disappointing future as a second-tier power. This fear is what led Germany to take the risks that helped ignite World War I. It prompted Japan to undertake the expansionist rampage that helped bring on World War II. Xi has grand ambitions, from capturing Taiwan to establishing China’s primacy in Asia and, eventually, the world. If he loses faith that the patient accumulation of economic power will bring Beijing these rewards, he may become more inclined to take risks and use China’s coercive tools to secure them instead. This means that the task of dealing with China could prove quite ticklish in the years ahead. The United States can’t simply rest easy, confident that a peaking China will fade away. Instead, it will have to rapidly firm up its defenses in places where an impatient Beijing might lunge for advantage, such as the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies will have to join forces to prevent China from weaponizing its still considerable economic and technological leverage to fracture the anti-Beijing coalitions now taking shape. And they will have to ensure, through multilateral control measures as well as investments in their own capabilities, that the democratic world maintains its edge in semiconductors and other critical technologies that will shape the future balance of economic and military power. Yet Washington and its friends will also have to do all this while keeping channels of communication open and not unnecessarily provoking an anxious China that may lash out as its predicament worsens. After all, power and pessimism can make a deadly mix. The hardest sort of China to handle may be one that is strong and weak at the same time.

### Russia-China Already Allied

#### Russia China alliance growing based on opposition to democracies, specifically US, may also embolden autocratic governments

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Rivals for centuries, China and Russia now have a partnership that has “no limits,” Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin said in early February. The energy, military and political ties nurtured over the past decade between the world’s two most powerful authoritarian states — both of which aim to upend at least parts of the US-dominated, post-Cold War order — have aroused growing concern among democratic leaders from Washington to Tokyo. Just weeks after the joint statement, when Russia invaded Ukraine, China refused to condemn the move. Still, the support Beijing has shown its ally since has been anything but boundless. The rapprochement was driven by a common alienation from America that deepened after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and became increasingly overt after the 2008 financial crisis, which originated in the US. Both states concluded that the meltdown would undercut faith globally in the US economic and political model. They increased ties cautiously until 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula triggered sanctions and a definitive break between Russia and the wider West. That forced Moscow to look for new partners and especially new markets for its energy exports. China was a good fit, proving a massive and fast-growing buyer of Russian commodities and weapons. The two states also share a deep hostility toward US alliances in what they consider their own rightful spheres of influence. For Russia, that’s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe; for China, it’s Washington’s network of bilateral defense treaties in the Indo-Pacific region. Though short of a formal, treaty-based alliance, the partnership between China and Russia has been enhanced by a strong personal bond between Putin and Xi. Products of tough childhoods, both men have evinced a determination to crush dissent at home and restore their nations to greatness, ending their perceived humiliation by the US and Europe. They have met more than 30 times, making dumplings together in Tianjin and pancakes in Vladivostok. In 2019, Xi called Putin his “best friend.” In a joint statement in February, they spelled out their shared contempt for Western ideas of democracy. They defined democracy without reference to elections, independent courts or free media and said it was about economic development, with all models for public political participation equally valid. In the 1800s, Russia was among European powers that imposed so-called unequal treaties on China’s Qing dynasty, including one ceding the territory where the Russian city Vladivostok sits today. Relations improved dramatically for a short period after Mao Zedong led China’s Communist Party to power in 1949, finding a natural ally in Josef Stalin. But Mao opposed the political reforms known as de-Stalinization that followed the Soviet leader’s 1953 death and, in 1961, he split from Moscow. In 1969, the two countries fought a brief border war over disputed territories and, in 1972, China did the unthinkable by turning toward the US. It wasn’t until the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev took charge in the Kremlin, that relations began to thaw again. Since 2014, Russia has sold China some of its most advanced weapons systems, including $5 billion worth of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and SU-35 attack jets. Within two months of Crimea’s annexation, Russia’s Gazprom PJSC signed a deal it said was worth about $400 billion to supply China with natural gas through a pipeline called the Power of Siberia. A second pipeline deal has been struck since. In addition, the two countries have increasingly coordinated their positions at the United Nations Security Council, where both wield vetoes. The growing cooperation between China and Russia has led some policy makers in the US to fear that the country could be forced to fight wars on two fronts, for example if Russia were to threaten an American ally in Europe to distract the US during a confrontation with China over Taiwan. US Senator Jim Inhofe argued last year that, adjusted for purchasing power parity, the two nations combined spend more on defense than the US. There’s a wider concern that the combination of economic, military and political muscle the two can muster is emboldening other world leaders with autocratic tendencies, undermining confidence in democracy as a political system, and threatening the version of the rules-based international order promoted by the US and its allies since the end of the Cold War. China avoided criticizing the invasion, blamed the US and NATO for the conflict, and bought Russian oil that was being shunned by some other countries, indirectly funding Moscow’s war machine. But Xi proved reluctant to unequivocally back the war or help Russia cushion the financial impact of US and European Union sanctions. With a gross domestic product almost eight times the size of Russia’s, China has substantially more at stake in a global economy that’s still dominated by the US and other developed democracies.

#### Chinese Russian relations have been great since 2014 – invasion of Crimea and decline of the west

Taylor and Shullman 22 (Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program, Center for New American Security and David O. Shullman is a Senior Director of the Global China Hub, Atlantic Council. “Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine,” 6-22-22, https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine)ZK

Previous Russian aggression in Ukraine has been a catalyst for deepening Russia-China relations. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 significantly accelerated the slow warming of the relationship that started in the waning days of the Cold War. Convinced that it had no real economic opportunities in the West, the Kremlin turned to China for help in offsetting Western pressure. At that time, China’s initial support for Moscow was tepid. Beijing was vaguely critical of the West for supposedly causing the crisis, and it never verbally supported Russian annexation, abstained on key UN resolutions, and allowed Chinese firms to abide by U.S. and European sanctions. China also took advantage of Russia’s increased economic dependence to drive a hard bargain on key energy deals. Yet Beijing eventually leaned into its partnership with Russia. While Moscow’s need to diversify away from the West energized relations, Beijing also came around to recognize the utility in building a stronger relationship with the Kremlin. In particular, the China-Russia partnership crystallized around a fundamentally similar view of the United States as a primary strategic threat. Both Xi and Putin view U.S. support for democracies in their regions—and for those fighting repression and authoritarianism inside China and Russia—as an effort to extend influence and ultimately overthrow their regimes. The leaders also view the U.S. alliance network—including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Quad grouping in the Indo-Pacific—as a direct challenge to their security and to their regimes. In the wake of 2014, these views hardened, especially as both countries’ relations with the United States grew more adversarial. Moreover, Xi and Putin have noted the increasing challenges facing Western democracies and have grown more confident that the United States and the West are in decline. They therefore view the time as ripe to challenge the U.S.-dominated global order and alliance network and hasten Washington’s retrenchment from their respective peripheries. Both also expect the United States to do everything in its power to hold onto its superpower status, particularly in the face of China’s rise, including coercing its allies to take actions against their own interests. Russia and China’s deepening alignment since 2014, along with the complementarity of their needs and capabilities, has fueled growing ties across all dimensions of their partnership. In the economic sphere, for example, China’s share of Russia’s external trade doubled from 10 to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021. Their partnership deepened most notably in the defense domain and in their common crusade against democracy and the universality of human rights. Arms sales and technical cooperation have grown, as have the frequency, scope, and complexity of their joint military exercises. In the democracy domain, Moscow and Beijing together are popularizing authoritarian governance, exporting their best practices, watering down human rights norms, backing each other up in multilateral forums, creating norms around cyber and internet sovereignty, and bolstering illiberal leaders. Despite these developments since 2014, China is once again treading carefully in the aftermath of Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine. China has abstained from voting on key UN resolutions, and Chinese firms are tentative about maintaining operations with Russia, given their desire to avoid secondary sanctions. The key difference, reflecting the much deeper starting point of their relationship going into this crisis, has been China’s far stronger rhetorical support for Russia. Senior Chinese officials not only indicated support for the Kremlin’s “reasonable security concerns” about potential NATO expansion as a justification for its initial actions but have since doubled down on pledges to deepen ties with Russia, parroting Russian talking points about its actions in Ukraine and the culpability of the United States and NATO for the conflict’s endurance. To signal their enduring close partnership, Russia and China flew joint patrols near Japanese and South Korean air defense zones in May 2022 during President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia designed to rally America’s U.S. Indo-Pacific allies.

#### Iran, Russia, and China are teaming up and holding drills—regional tensions growing with the U.S

RFE/LE ’22 (RFE/RL journalists report the news in 27 languages in 23 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established

-- **“**Iran, Russia, China Hold Joint Naval Drill Amid Growing Ties” --January 21, 2022

--<https://www.rferl.org/a/31663080.html)//Mari_narasauce>

Iran, Russia, and China are holding their third joint naval drill in the northern Indian Ocean, amid speculation that the three countries are teaming up in the face of growing regional tensions with the United States. Russian vessels, together with the Chinese and Iranian navies, performed "joint tactical maneuvering and practiced artillery fire at a naval target as well as search-and-rescue missions at sea," the Russian Defense Ministry said on January 21, adding that the sides also "practiced inspection and liberation of a ship that was supposedly captured by pirates." Eleven Iranian vessels were joined by three Russian ships and two Chinese vessels, Iranian Rear Admiral Mostafa Tajoldini earlier told state TV. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are also participating in the exercises, with smaller ships and helicopters. Since coming to office in June 2021, Iran's hard-line President Ebrahim Raisi has pursued a policy to deepen ties with both Moscow and Beijing. Russia, Iran, and China are subject to Western sanctions imposed over various issues, including Russia’s threats on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, human rights abuses in China, and Iran’s nuclear program. “Improving bilateral relations between Tehran and Moscow will enhance security for the region and the international arena,” Raisi said upon [returning from a visit](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-putin-raisi/31662000.html) to Russia on January 21, according to the government news agency IRNA. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian paid a visit to China last week during which it was announced that Beijing and Tehran have launched a 25-year cooperation deal aimed at bolstering economic and political ties. In September, Iran’s bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was approved by the seven current members of the security body led by Beijing and Moscow. The country will formally join the grouping after the technical and legal process concludes, which is expected to take up to two years.

## Link Answers

Kind of already spotting them the link because of aff advantage claims.

### No AI Link

#### US-China AI competition is not zero-sum – collaboration with clear goals solves.

Sullivan 21 (Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan is an Army pilot by trade, who lived and studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar. He was one of just five Army officers selected that year. Ryan has taken his experience in and knowledge of China and combined that with graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence. “US China AI Competition Factors,” 10/04/21 <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D>, p9)ZK

The U.S. and China remain the two nations best positioned to benefit from the increasing adoption of AI across society. Competition over AI is not zero-sum, in that both nations will derive value from AI growth, but the benefits are not shared equally. China’s substantial advantages in data and the size of its market lead experts to predict that China will account for nearly half of the estimated $15.7 trillion that AI will add to the global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, and almost double the expected growth in North America.23 AI’s economic benefits are undeniable, but AI competition with China goes beyond GDP growth and centers on the global diffusion of Chinese values, norms, and standards for AI utilization. That environment is very much undecided, as the international community struggles with challenges over data privacy, the role of AI-empowered multinational companies, and critical choke points in supply chains that impact the AI industry and threaten national security interests. This paper seeks to recognize that collaboration occurs between the U.S. and China and identifies efforts to address security concerns, collaborations, and even cooperation in areas of trans-national challenges that benefit all of humankind. The deteriorating bilateral relationships and mistrust likely prohibit bilateral cooperation in many areas. However, in working with like-minded nations with shared values, the U.S. can promote multilateral collaboration and cooperation opportunities for AI. Such engagements should not exclude China by design. However, the criteria for engagement must clarify that the values shared by democratic nations will help address the ethical concerns over AI and the adoption of technical standards. The current political environment and U.S. actions taken against universities and companies with ties to the PLA leave very little room for military-to-military (mil-to-mil) collaboration on AI, nor did research for this paper discover any indications from Chinese sources of a desire for mil-to-mil engagements. Nevertheless, in focusing on our allies and promoting interoperability, the Department of Defense (DoD) entities must remain aware that collaboration opportunities might arise in various areas of responsibility (AOR) and prepare appropriate guidance and safeguards for units based on current policies.

### Russia Alliance Turn

#### The more Russia loses (the aff), the more China will support them. Worst case, everything is balanced.

Blanchette 22 (Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/>) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

## Growth Impact Answers

### Growth Resilient

#### Chinese growth is resilient – reforms ensure that small dips won’t stick

Liu 16 – (Chinese ambassador to the UK, “The Chinese economy is still full of power”, 2/27/16, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/12175115/The-Chinese-economy-is-still-full-of-power.html)//EO

A glass is filled halfway with water. Pessimists would say it’s half empty, while optimists would say it’s half full. The same is true when it comes to the Chinese economy. Quite a few pessimists have been forecasting doom and gloom since the beginning of the year. However, they have failed to see the country’s resilience and the new driving forces that have emerged. In fact, [the recent moderation in China’s growth is the anticipated result of reform measures and regulation](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/02/26/ftse-100-extends-gains-and-china-rebounds-as-finance-ministers-g/). This is therefore the “new normal”: we are seeing slower yet better quality growth helped along by proactive and deeper reforms. Of course, China’s growth rate could easily have exceeded 7 per cent if the energy- and- pollution-intensive industries had been given free rein, or if massive stimulus measures had been applied. China, however, chose not to opt for this kind of unsustainable growth – because it would come with a huge cost and would sacrifice the long-term development of China and the world. Instead, China has chosen to focus on the following five key areas: addressing excess capacity, downsizing property inventories, expanding effective supply, helping enterprises reduce cost and guarding against financial risks. This approach, like losing weight, won’t be without its discomforts or pain. But just as perseverance will see one through a diet – to less fat, stronger muscles and a healthier body – so it is with the Chinese economy. Despite the moderation in growth, the fundamentals of the Chinese economy remain strong. While the stock and foreign exchange markets have their own patterns, the key is to look at the bigger picture. It is true that the 6.9 per cent growth in 2015 was the lowest for China in 25 years. But this was achieved by an economy that is 10 trillion dollars in size. The actual increment is equivalent to the yearly GDP of a medium-sized country and it is larger than the amount generated by double-digit growth years ago. In other words, against the background of the sluggish world economy, China remains one of the fastest-growing major economies – and it contributes over one quarter of global growth. Consumption now accounts for two thirds of China’s growth and the service sector now makes up more than half of GDP. China’s solid material foundation, abundant human resources and vast market potential will continue to provide a sound basis and condition for sustained economic growth. The gap between the eastern and western regions, and between the urban and rural areas, indicates ample spaces and untapped potentials for further development. Moreover, the ongoing process of new industrialisation, IT application, urbanisation and agricultural modernisation is generating strong driving forces for growth. China’s fiscal deficit and government debt is also secure and much lower than that of the US, Europe and Japan, leaving enough room for further positive regulation. Going forward, five new engines will drive forward China’s economy. The first engine is the 13th Five Year Plan. With its five key development concepts – innovation, balanced growth, a green economy, opening up and inclusive development – this Plan will map out the way for China to get over the “middle-income trap” and join the high-income economies. The second engine is supply-side reform. Rather than being a copy of Reaganomics or Thatcherism, China’s supply-side reform is a response to the economic “new normal” in China. Its core mechanism is to replace ineffective and low-end supply with effective and high-end supply, which will increase competitiveness. The third engine is open development. China will continue to improve its domestic business environment in terms of legal, international and business-friendly practices. The fourth engine is China’s active involvement in global economic governance and in providing public goods. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, officially inaugurated last month, is just one example of this. The fifth engine is innovation-driven development. China will optimise the allocation of key resources in order to stimulate innovation, to create new demands and new supply, and to give rise to new businesses. Since the financial crisis, China has made an outstanding contribution to global growth. It is widely recognised as the world’s economic powerhouse and has fulfilled its responsibility as a key global player. Make no mistake: that engine is still full of power and will continue to bring opportunities and benefits to the world. “Although Zhou was an ancient state, it had a reform mission.” This line from a 3000-year-old Chinese work, the Classic of Poetry, best portrays the country’s commitment to reform. Today, reform and innovation remain the source of confidence and strength for China. There is every reason to look to a world-embracing China for steady progress and for a promising economic future.

### AT: Diversionary War

#### No diversionary wars --- social instability is too dangerous

Levi and Economy, 16 - both Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations \*PhD, David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the CFR \*\*PhD, C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Elizabeth, “Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China's Slowing Growth” February 25, 2016, Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, *Council on Foreign Relations*]

...But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes

By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This “wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace.

Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

### AT: CCP Collapse

#### Growth or decline doesn’t matter --- it’s how the regime frames the issue, which proves it’s resilient

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific*, Academia]

As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, there is no empirical evidence to prove that the CCP’s legitimacy solely relies on economic success. Arguably, there are two major problems in the relevant literature: the exclusion of ideological factors and the narrow focus of government performance. The major problem with the socioeconomic performance approach lies in its exclusion of ideological factors, which leads to many problematic arguments and predictions. The performance legitimacy approach implies a problematic relationship between economy and politics (White, 1986). The argument – that legitimacy of the CCP primarily relies on economic performance – implies that economic crisis or the slowdown of economic growth would lead to some kinds of legitimacy crises or major disasters in China. This is also explicitly warned by many who argue that economic deterioration will unavoidably lead to political crisis (Krugman, 2013; Zhao, 2009). This kind of argument implies that economic factors are the independent or dominant variables, while political factors are subordinate or dependent variables. It is flawed to contend that the regime is helpless in an economic crisis. This book endorses White’s assertion (1986) on the primacy of politics – that proper political actions can fill the deficit in legitimacy created by economic difficulties. As mentioned in the Introduction chapter, legitimacy directly comes from neither economic crisis nor economic growth per se (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). Ideological factors will transform economic performance into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance, and regime legitimacy is based on “those perceptions” rather than on economic performance per se. As such, an economic crisis is not a direct threat to a regime – its impacts on political legitimacy depend on people’s perceptions of the crisis and the regime; thus, how the government frames this crisis is crucial (Gilley and Holbig, 2010). In other words, how political actors use ideological factors to frame people’s perceptions of the crisis (i.e., discourse) is key to deciding the impact of the crisis on legitimacy. Proper political actions and effective crisis management will contribute to minimize legitimacy loss or even sometimes enhance legitimacy. As discussed below, there is much room to manipulate people’s dependency on the government and on its irreplaceable role during a crisis. This is especially true in China, where people’s dependency on the government is more obvious because of historical traditions (Tong, 2011). The CCP has abundant experience and the capability to market its authoritarian rule through information control and powerful propaganda campaigns. In the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the Chinese government actually won, rather than lost, legitimacy credits. The regime strategically manipulated this crisis as an opportunity to achieve its political purposes including the promotion of Scientific Outlook of Development (Holbig, 2011). The Chinese media highlighted China’s good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically in contrast with the disaster that this crisis caused in other countries, and the official media also made efforts to project international recognition onto China’s crisis management. By using those propaganda strategies, the CCP successfully transformed its performance during this crisis into positive perceptions, thus legitimacy (Holbig, 2011).

#### No internal link --- the economy is not directly reflected in legitimacy --- ideology outweighs

Zeng, 16 – PhD in Politics and IR, Associate Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick, and Lecturer in Politics and IR at Royal Holloway, University of London [Jinghan, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule,” Oct 29, 2015 Palgrave Macmillan *Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific*, Academia]

Economic performance is the most frequently mentioned element of performance legitimacy. The conventional wisdom of Western scholar- ship holds that economic achievement is a principal (if not the sole) pillar of legitimacy in contemporary China (Krugman, 2013; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Perry, 2008; Shambaugh, 2001; Wang, 2005a; Wang, 2005b; Zhao, 2009; Yang and Zhao, 2014). In a major textbook on Chinese politics, Tony Saich (2004: 347) argues that “[CCP] legitimacy is currently based on the capacity to deliver the economic goods.” Economic performance is absolutely important. However, empirical studies show that while economic performance matters, there is no strong evidence to prove that it is the sole, let alone the principal, pillar of legitimacy (Chu, 2013; Lewis-Beck, et al., 2013; Munro, et al., 2013; Yang and Tang, 2013). In addition, if economic prosperity leads to high levels of popular support for the government, why do not other coun- tries that enjoy economic prosperity – such as India and Brazil – also have high levels of support, as China does (Tang, et al., 2013)? Based on a 2010 national survey in China, Dickson (2013) finds a negative rela- tionship between economic development and popular support. In addition to economic performance, social stability is another essen- tial element of government performance, and it has also been widely accepted as a fundamental pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy (Breslin, 2009; Dickson, 2011; Laliberté and Lanteigne, 2008b; Shue, 2004; Sandby- Thomas, 2011). Shue (2004), for example, argues that the CCP “stakes” its legitimacy on its ability to maintain social stability. Needless to say, social stability and economic growth are interdependent. Without a stable social order, the economy cannot grow rapidly; conversely the welfare materials delivered by economic growth might help to enhance social stability. This interdependence suggests that the rules of modern states are based on different combinations of legitimacy sources rather than on any one pillar. Legitimacy by nature has many dimensions, and its sources are often interrelated. Ideology in particular plays a crucial role in influ- encing other sources of legitimacy. Arguably, a fatal weakness of the performance legitimacy approach is its insufficient attention to ideo- logical factors. As mentioned, the mainstream approach overempha- sizes economic growth, and many assume that market reform has also rendered ideology obsolete. This misguided view has underestimated the role of ideology in contemporary China. Legitimacy generated from government performance is not directly through government performance per se but from citizens’ subjective perceptions of this performance. Ideological factors play a crucial role in shaping those perceptions. Thus, economic performance – crisis or growth – is not directly reflected in legitimacy (Gilley and Holbig, 2010); the performance will be framed by ideological factors and transformed by conductive ways into people’s subjective perceptions of economic performance. If economic performance became the sole legitimacy pillar in China, then economic deterioration would unavoidably lead to political crisis. However, the financial crisis of 2008 enhanced rather than weakened the CCP’s rule (Holbig, 2011). By using the Chinese media to highlight the good performance in coping with the financial crisis domestically and the disaster this crisis caused in other countries, the CCP managed to manipulate this debacle as an opportunity to gain legitimacy and achieve its political purposes – such as marketing its then-official ideology, the “Scientific Outlook of Development” (Holbig, 2011).

### Growth Bad – Aggression

#### Slowing China’s economy is essential — growth emboldens China to dominate Asia, increasing the likelihood of war

Mearsheimer 16 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, interviewed by Peter Navarro, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Merage School of Business at the University of California-Irvine, holds a Ph.D. in Economics and a Masters of Public Administration from Harvard University, 2016 (“Mearsheimer on Strangling China & the Inevitability of War,” *Huffington Post*, March 10th, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-navarro-and-greg-autry/mearsheimer-on-strangling\_b\_9417476.html, Accessed 8-22-16)

\*Author Initials added for Clarity

JJM: My argument, in a nutshell, is that if China continues to grow economically over the next 30 years, much the way it has over the past 30 years, that it will translate that wealth into military might. And it will try to dominate Asia, the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. And my argument is that this makes good strategic sense for China. Of course, the United States will not allow that to happen if it can. And the United States will, therefore, form a balancing coalition in Asia, which will include most of China’s neighbors and the United States. And they will work overtime to try to contain China and prevent it from dominating Asia. This will lead to a very intense security competition between the United States and China’s neighbors on one hand, and China on the other hand. And there will be an ever-present danger of war. PN: Of course from this observation rises the imperative if not to strangle China’s economy then to certainly slow it down. JJM: There’s no question that preventive war makes no sense at all, but a much more attractive strategy would be to do whatever we could to slow down China’s economic growth. Because if it doesn’t grow economically, it can’t turn that wealth into military might and become a potential hegemon in Asia. I mean, what really makes China so scary today is the fact that it has so many people and it’s also becoming an incredibly wealthy country. Our great fear is that China will turn into a giant Hong Kong. And if it has a per capita GNP that’s anywhere near Hong Kong’s GNP, it will be one formidable military power. So the question is, Can you prevent it from becoming a giant Hong Kong?

### Growth Bad – Japan

#### Chinese economic decline prevents Sino-Japan war and cements US leadership

Glaser and Funaiole, 15– \*senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS AND fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie and Matthew, “Geopolitical Consequences of China’s Slowdown” 11/16, http://csis.org/files/publication/151116\_Glaser\_Funaiole\_Geopolitical.pdf

Similarly, China’s economic slowdown could offer Japan an occasion to gain leverage in the Sino-Japanese relationship, creating the possibility to tamp down tensions in the East China Sea and stabilize bilateral ties that remain a fragile, but critically important, component of the regional security landscape. Perhaps most significantly, a Chinese economic slowdown affords the United States an opportunity to buttress its political, economic, and military position in the Asia-Pacific, and assuage worries that the United States lacks sufficient strategic vision and political commitment to the region. The outcome relies on how Washington plays its hand, but the result could be the strengthening of a rules-based, U.S.-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region for years to come.

#### A Chinese-Japan war is only an incident away and goes nuclear

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Harry, "Get Ready, America: Are China and Japan Destined for War?," Jan 22, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-are-china-japan-destined-war-14991?page=2

While your Twitter and Facebook feed these days might be filled with stories about Iran, North Korea and ISIS, as well as the South China Sea, 2016 could be the year of a deadly clash between China and Japan—and the stakes could not be any higher for the United States. A recent article in Foreign Policy sets the stage for such a clash—and shows how America could get sucked in. After a relatively peaceful year—if such a thing exists in the East China Sea—Beijing and Tokyo are once again warning each other to back off claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With the rhetoric heading up, Foreign Policy reporters Dan De Luce and Keith Johnson headed over to the Rand Corporation for a war game that pitted China vs. Japan and eventually the United States. In the simulation, Tokyo’s treaty ally pledged to defend the island nation, including the disputed islands, from attack. The scenario for the wargame was frighteningly realistic to say the least: “A group of renegade Japanese ultranationalists wade ashore on a barren islet they call Uotsuri-shima. It’s the largest of a cluster of uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks known as the Senkakus, or the Diaoyu in Chinese, the unlikely locus of a long-running territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing. The activists plant the Japanese flag, declaring that the islands are inalienable Japanese territory; their YouTube video threatens the Chinese navy with destruction if it dares to seize the islands. “Caught off guard, Tokyo is slow to respond, but eventually disowns the ultranationalists and their stunt. By then, though, China has condemned the move as a hostile act and has dispatched armed coast guard and naval vessels to the relatively shallow waters around the Senkakus. Chinese marines arrest the 14 activists and vow to bring them back to China for prosecution. “The next day, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force is dispatched to the area, accompanied by a squadron of Japanese F-15 fighters. China maintains its naval ships around the islands and insists that it will not withdraw from the area. As the two militaries appear headed on a collision course, Tokyo informs Washington that it is finally invoking the mutual defense treaty the two nations have had since 1951. Now the White House has a decision to make.” While it is well worth your time to read all the twists and turns, here is the ultimate of spoilers: “The United States sends humanitarian aid and disaster-response teams to Japan to bolster its homeland defense and dispatches the carrier at a safe distance in flight range of the Senkakus. It also launches targeted, precision strikes on a handful of Chinese missile sites on the coast, clearly explaining to Chinese leadership the limited nature of the measures.” And into hell we descend: “U.S. missiles rain down on the Chinese homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas; China’s shiny new navy is quickly shrinking under relentless undersea attacks. In reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and take a potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the George Washington, damaging it and forcing it out of the area. The casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead.” Feel a sense of déjà vu, National Interest readers? It seems good minds think alike, as I explored a very similar scenario back in June of 2014: “Picture it: It's March 1, 2015. Tokyo and Beijing are headed towards what was once the unthinkable. “Over the last several months China has instituted daily non-naval maritime patrols around the hotly disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Beijing is even sending fully-fledged naval assets within the islands' 12 mile exclusion zone while its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, exercised only 50 miles away from the islands back in February — truly the end of Beijing's small-stick diplomatic strategy. “But on 1 March the plot thickens. Two Chinese SU-27 fighters come within 25 feet of a Japanese P-3 Orion surveillance plane just 10 miles west of the Senkakus (sound familiar?). The Japanese pilot gets nervous. A slight tweak at the controls and the Japanese plane collides with one of the Chinese fighters. Both aircraft crash into the ocean, with no survivors. "Naturally each side blames the other. Beijing accuses the Japanese pilots of violating Chinese sovereign airspace and violating its Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ. Japan claims the Chinese pilots acted recklessly, flying so close. The media in both countries fan the flames of nationalism. Just 72 hours later, a group of twenty Chinese nationals land on one of the disputed islands under the cover of darkness. Rumors swirl that Beijing knew of the voyage but did nothing to stop it. A Japanese naval task force carrying a small detachment of soldiers is dispatched. Their goal: remove the only residents of the disputed five-island chain. “Beijing threatens force if its citizens are harmed. As Japanese naval forces come within 20 miles of the islands a Chinese J-10 fighter jet buzzes the task force. On its second pass it comes dangerously close to a Japanese destroyer. In a perceived act of self-defense, the destroyer shoots down the aircraft. “Hours later, as Japanese forces begin operations to remove the Chinese nationals from the Senkakus, Beijing fires a warning shot, a DF-21D or “carrier-killer” missile which hits the ocean just 10 miles away from the Japanese task force. Undeterred, Japanese forces press ahead. Domestic pressure on Chinese leaders becomes intense. They feel they have no choice but to escalate, launching a massive saturation strike with ballistic and cruise missiles against the Japanese task force. Three vessels are hit with heavy loss of life. Global media coverage of the burning hulks and bodies in the water reaches a fever pitch. Prime Minister Abe urgently phones President Obama formally requesting America's help under the terms of the US-Japan alliance — a 3am call no president would ever wish to receive. War in Asia seems imminent.” So what to make of all this crazy block quoting? Simple: a conflict in Asia—which would make problems like ISIS seem like mere child's play—is only an incident away. And make no mistake about it, such a conflict, considering that the United States and China are armed with nuclear weapons, would be a frightening affair. Food for thought as we contemplate other pressing national security challenges—for if Asia was ever to be engulfed in the flames of great power war only bad things would result, with millions of lives in the balance.

### Growth Bad – BioD

#### Chinese growth causes massive species extinction in China—extinction

Nagle 9 [John Copeland, prof at Notre Dame Law School, “The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law,” Spring, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. Law 203]

China offers the best and the worst of biodiversity protection. China is a vast, varied nation that hosts an incredible range of ecosystems and species. "China's biodiversity ranks eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere." n67 Over 100,000 species of animals and nearly 33,000 plant species exist in 460 different types of ecosystems. Those ecosystems include forests, grasslands, deserts, wetlands, seas and coastal areas, and agricultural ecosystems. China hosts 212 different types of bamboo forests alone. China also has an unusual number of ancient and relic species because of its protection from historic geologic events such as the movement of glaciers. Most famously, it is the only home of the giant panda, the symbol of many efforts to protect biodiversity throughout the world today. Such species and ecosystem diversity is complemented by an unsurpassed collection of genetic diversity. "The richness of China's cultivated plants and domestic animals are incomparable in the world. Not only did many plants and animals on which human survival depend originate in China, but it also retains large numbers of their wild prototypes and relatives." n68 A 2005 report estimated that China's biodiversity is valued at nearly five hundred billion dollars. n69 China is also the home for more than 1.25 billion people. The rapid economic growth that China has experienced since 1980 strains the nation's ability to preserve ecosystems, species, and genetic resources. But the biodiversity of China has encountered countless threats for thousands of years, including the cultivation of more and more land for agriculture and the consequences of numerous wars. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 1960, [\*216] Mao Zedong targeted the "Four Pests": rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes. The attack on sparrows enlisted schoolchildren to knock down nests and to beat gongs so that the sparrows could not find a place to rest. Only after sparrows were virtually eliminated throughout China did the country's leaders recognize the value of the birds in controlling insects. China faces many of the same threats as biodiversity in other countries, with the notable addition of the country's notorious air pollution. Habitat loss is the biggest threat to biodiversity in China. As in many other countries, rapid economic development and continued population growth exert relentless pressure on previously undeveloped areas that offered habitat to a diversity of wildlife and plants. The overgrazing of rangelands, erosion, and the adverse effects of tourism and mining further compromise the condition of ecosystems and species throughout China.

## Hege Impact Answers

### AI Link

#### Chinese AI decks U.S. heg—superior UAVs and unrestricted exports threaten U.S. AI leadership.

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The Final Report released by the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence in 2021 describes China as a “competitor,” if not a leader, to the United States in terms of AI development. A basic understanding of the US-China AI competition is established in the report: “. . . we must win the AI competition that is intensifying strategic competition with China. China’s plans, resources, and progress should concern all Americans. It is an AI peer in many areas and an AI leader in some applications. We take seriously China’s ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s AI leader within a decade.”5 The report also foresees China’s determination to surpass the United States in AI leadership with its talent and technological development. This section demonstrates the area of China’s AI development and applications. Before digging into the military aspects, the reason China has been devoted into AI should be explained. In 2015, China issued the document Made in China 2025 and two years later in 2017, China released the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan. These two documents proved that China’s central government officially confirmed the importance of developing AI technologies. The primary purpose of China’s AI development is for domestic use. First, advanced technologies are the major driving force for the economic and commercial development in China. To maintain its rapid growth, China encourages high technologies research and development, including AI, thus many private firms and research institutions have entered this field. Second, AI has been adopted domestically to improve the overall well-being, for example, payment using facial recognition, online AI-driven medical diagnosis, and security cameras that are designed to enhance safety. China's determination of developing AI technologies is not supported only by documents but also practice. The Ministry of National Defense has established research institutions—the Artificial Intelligence Research Centre and the Unmanned Systems Research Centre—to focus on AI and unmanned systems research and development. The key military think tank, the Academy of Military Science (AMS), has also updated its doctrine to cope with the AI technological development: “The revamped AMS is tasked with driving defense innovation and ensuring that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) warfighting theory and doctrine fully capitalize on disruptive technologies like AI and autonomous systems.”6 In addition to the government-backed official organizations, a number of private institutions have also invested considerable sums of money to conduct related research. The central government of China uses the term “intelligentized” warfare to refer to the innovations in military technologies.7 Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy analyzed more than 300 AI-related equipment contracts of the PLA regarding the adoption of AI technologies, and the result of their research shows that around 2 percent of PLA contracts are related to AI in the half year from April to November 2020. The research also predicted that China would continue to invest in AI technologies and may create vulnerabilities for the United States. Moreover, to quickly transfer technologies from the private sector to the public, China also launched a national strategy, the military-civil fusion, to create a favorable research and development environment.8 Among all the AI technologies, China places the top priority on unmanned combat systems and equipment along with other advanced military innovations.9 Unmanned technology has been profoundly changing the face of warfare, and unmanned equipment is one of the first options for future combat equipment. Since President Xi Jinping took office, he has emphasized the importance of unmanned systems on various occasions. For example, in 2017, when Xi Jinping visited the training of unmanned operations, he said to the sergeant that “UAVs are important combat forces for the modern battlefield. You must carry out your duties well and cultivate good personnel.”10 Another example was in 2020, when Xi met students at the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Aviation University, he declared, “Drones are profoundly changing war scenarios. It is necessary to strengthen drone combat research, education and training, and accelerate the training of drone pilots and commanders.”11 The capacities of unmanned combat systems include effectively reducing casualties, achieving accurate reconnaissance, striking, resupplying, configuring flexible activities, and significantly improving combat effectiveness—to list only a few of many such advantages. With the development of unmanned technology, human warfare places more and more value upon information, which AI and unmanned systems excel at procuring. China’s development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) began in the late 1950s.12 In 1959, it had basically figured out the law of self-pilot takeoff and landing of two types of aircraft, namely the An-2 and IL-28. In the mid to late 1960s, China had been investing in the development of UAVs and formed a series of target aircraft such as the Changkong-1 radio-controlled target UAV, the DR-5 high-altitude photo reconnaissance aircraft, and the D4 small remote-controlled aircraft. Moreover, in August 1958, the first unmanned aircraft developed by Northwestern Polytechnic University flew successfully, and in 1984, the university established the UAV Research Institute with the approval of the former Ministry of Aviation Industry. In the1970s, China developed ChangHong high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, T-6 general-purpose unmanned aircraft, Z-5 series unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, ASN series unmanned aircraft, and so forth. Dozens of these target and reconnaissance UAVs have been mass-produced and deployed alongside troops. The emergence of a large number of Chinese military UAVs began in 2006, when a number of military UAV designs appeared publicly in the limelight, such as the “Xianglong” high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, whose body design is very similar to the US “Global Hawk” high-altitude long-endurance reconnaissance UAV; the “Skyhawk-3” unmanned helicopter that can hover, take off, and land vertically; and the “Dark Sword” UAV shaped like a US-made stealth bomber, which can burst into the enemy’s airspace with its stealth and high-speed performance and conduct suppressive attacks on the enemy’s air defense forces.13 The PLA is equipped with at least four types of medium and large UAVs, namely the EA-03 Xianglong, the Attack 1 (Wing Dragon 1), the JWP02 (ASN-206), and the BZK-005 UAV. EA-03 Xianglong is China’s most advanced high-altitude long-endurance unmanned reconnaissance aircraft in service. With a status similar to that of the US RQ4 global-use UAV, it is mainly adopted for high-altitude strategic surveillance reconnaissance. The aircraft has an overall length of 14.33 meters, a wingspan of 24.86 meters, a normal takeoff weight of 6,800 kilograms, a mission load of 600 kilograms and an effective flight range of 7,000 kilometers. It can conduct continuous aerial surveillance for 10 hours at an altitude of 18,000 meters from 2,000 kilometers away. The front and rear wings are connected in a diamond shape, which greatly strengthens the stiffness of the wings with a certain stealth capability.14 During the standoff in DongLang in the in last year between China and India, three Xianglong aircraft had appeared at Shigatse airport, and this confirmed that troops have been equipped with the aircraft. The Attack-1, improved from Chengfei Institute's Yilong-1 (sometimes call the Wing Loong), was unveiled at the 2014 Zhuhai Airshow and was the first active PLA inspection and fighter UAV that was made public at the airshow. Its shape is similar to that of the US UAV MQ-9, while its size is similar to that of the MQ-1 Predator. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 1.2 tons, a length of 9 meters, a wingspan of 14 meters, a payload of 200 kilograms, a maximum lift of 5,300 meters and a range of 4,000 kilometers. The latest Yilong-2 has a major improvement in both size and performance, with a length of 11 meters, a wingspan of 20.5 meters, a maximum flight altitude of 9,000 meters, a maximum speed of 370 kilometers per hour, a maximum takeoff weight of 4.2 tons, and an external hang-up capacity of 480 kilograms. It is equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) as well as laser-guided missiles and GPS-guided bombs and is able to perform continuous missions for 20 hours. To date, there has been no news that the Yilong-2 has been put into service.15 The JWP02 UAV (ASN-206) was developed by the Xi’an Aisheng Group of Northwestern Polytechnic University and won the first prize of the National Science and Technology Progress Award in 1996. It is rumored that it had received technical support from Israel. The aircraft applies solid rockets in assisting flight, zero-length launch, parachute landing and recovery, and can be used multiple times. It has a maximum takeoff weight of 222 kilograms, mission equipment weight of 50 kilograms, practical lift of 6,000 meters, range of 150 kilometers, and endurance of four to eight hours. The aircraft, which was developed earlier than Attack-1 UAV, currently serves as the mainstay of China's tactical unmanned reconnaissance aircraft along with the Attack-1 UAV.16 BZK-005 UAV has certain stealth capability and is a medium and high-altitude long-range unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. It has a maximum lift of 8,000 meters, an endurance of 40 hours, a maximum takeoff weight of 1.25 tons and a maximum carrying weight of 150 kilograms. Early models are equipped with photoelectric pods, while the latest models are equipped with SAR and other electronic reconnaissance equipment. The media reported that the aircraft has been on a patrol flight mission in the East China Sea. The TYW1 Skyhawk UAV, which was developed on the basis of the BZK-005, rolled off the production line on November 14, 2017. It is reported that the maximum takeoff weight of the TYW-1 has increased to 1.5 tons, with a maximum bomb load of 300 kilograms.17 UAVs play three important roles in military applications, the first of which is reconnaissance and surveillance.18 UAVs can penetrate hundreds of kilometers or more behind enemy lines and are configured at high, medium, and low altitudes. They can provide important reference for strategic decision-making and battle command in large-scale military operations through scanning reconnaissance and close-in reconnaissance to obtain highly accurate intelligence information. The latter is very suitable for PLA military, divisional, and brigade-level forces of the PLA Marine Corps to conduct battlefield reconnaissance surveillance, target search and location, as well as battle results assessment. UAVs can also work with satellites and skywave over-the-horizon radar to search and track enemy maritime targets and transmit back target information in real time. In this way, military UAVs can become an important part of the “kill chain” in antiaircraft-carrier warfare. The second is electronic jamming.19 Electronic-jamming UAVs can fly over the enemy, emitting electromagnetic waves through their airborne equipment and the application of interference foil, and so forth to implement interference on the enemy’s air defense radar, fire control radar, early warning systems, and other electronic equipment to cover China's aircraft defense and ground attack. The third role is firepower destruction. In addition to antiradiation UAVs that can destruct the enemy’s radar and other electromagnetic equipment, attack UAVs, inspection and fighter UAVs, and so forth can also carry out effective firepower destruction against the enemy. Acquisition of UAV technologies has enhanced China’s confidence to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to protect claimed territory. In the early 2010s, China for the first time sent a UAV to the Diaoyu Dao/ Senkaku Island disputed area.20 It was able to easily avoid the detection of Japanese ground radar, which surprised the Japanese coast guard. It was only a short and tactical victory that the Chinese UAVs exploited the loopholes in Japan's air defense system and reached the Diaoyu Islands for cruising with an ultra-low-altitude blind spot; it did not change the strategic pattern of the Japanese side’s effective control over the Diaoyu Islands. The most common unmanned aircraft to cruise the Diaoyu Islands is the BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance aircraft—equipped with a rear-propelled engine, a dual-tail brace structure and an under-nose photoelectric/infrared detection device—first unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2006 and capable of flying continuously for 40 hours at an altitude of 26,000 feet.21 The BZK-005’s primary detection system is an electro-optical pod under the nose, which is equipped with a forward-looking infrared detection system, CCD cameras, and a laser range/target designation system. Wave-transparent materials are applied in the BZK-005 UAV; thus, it can be determined that it has a satellite communication system that can transmit information to the rear over radio range, which also indicates that the BZK-005 should have an activity radius of more than 1,000 kilometers. The application of the BZK-005 UAV has effectively enhanced the capability of China's naval maritime integrated surveillance system. At present, the quantity and quality of China's naval maritime surveillance aircraft are insufficient, and the application of the BZK-005 can improve the capability and coverage of China's naval target detection and indication system, especially for accurate detection and identification of targets in the middle and near sea, which helps China to comprehensively grasp the real-time situation in the relevant sea areas and provides support for relevant decision making. For nearly a decade since China sent the BZK-005 to the Diaoyu Island area without alerting Japan, Japan has been cooperating with the United States to equip itself by importing UAVs. Early this year, Japanese media reported that the United States and Japan are currently discussing a military deployment against China. According to the report, the United States and Japan plan to deploy MQ-9 UAVs near Kagoshima, a move designed to “respond to China's” regular military operations.22 UAVs are characterized by high speed and high altitude. The MQ-9 made its first flight in 2014 after improvements were made, and then it was used by the US military. It is understood that the UAV deployed in Kagoshima is a reconnaissance type and it is also the first time the United States deployed this high-altitude type of UAV in Japan. With the US pivots in Asia, tensions between the two giants, namely China and the United States, have been inevitable. Located in the southwestern tip of Japan, Kagoshima has a very special geographical location in that, if the United States deploys the MQ-9 UAV on the island, it will obtain the information about the activities of the Chinese naval fleet. In other words, the MQ-9 UAV is the US “eye” planted in the vicinity of China for receiving information. In addition, the specific location of the US deployment of the MQ-9 UAV is also thought-provoking, for the reason that to the further south of Kagoshima, there are the Okinawa Islands, followed by the Miyako Strait waters. This area is the “treasure land” that is of great military importance. When the United States and Japan intervenes in the Taiwan Strait conflict, should it occur, the Miyako Strait waters are the shortest cut they must go through. Obviously, China is also aware of this problem. Therefore, China should pay close attention to the Miyako Strait when the cross-strait unification attack commences, if this is the only way. In this context, the US UAVs deployed in Kagoshima are the main means of reconnaissance for the United States and Japan. The UAVs must not only watch out for the moves of the Chinese side, but also conduct reconnaissance of Chinese defense networks. UAVs are not only used in the East China Sea area, but also the South China Sea area. Even in the border conflicts between China and India, UAVs were also applied. Despite that there has not been any offensive action taken by UAVs in the mentioned areas, one cannot deny the potential there. Considering the unstable situation in the Indo-Pacific, states either focus on AI technologies research, including UAVs, or import arms and technologies from others. It is still unknown that whether the applications of AI technology will eventually arouse an arm race. Concerns The advanced AI technologies that are applied in the military field can exert great impact on deterrence and warfare in the future. Meanwhile, China’s rapid development of AI technologies and applications in its military are cause for increasing concern by the United States. Despite the success of China’s AI in commercial areas, no clear evidence has indicated that China’s military has plans to apply AI in any lethal systems. In the short term, weaknesses still exist despite China’s preexisting foundation on AI commercial applications. Allen points out that China has disadvantages in top talents and technical standards, as well as in software frameworks and platforms.23 For example, the case of restrictions on ZTE and Huawei clearly reveals that China heavily depends on imports of critical products, which means that China still has a long way to go until it becomes fully independent in vital sectors, such as semiconductors. AI technology itself is not offensive, but it is likely to play an irreplaceable directorial role in warfare if it is applied to automating weapons, especially nuclear weapons. To avoid unwanted jeopardy to any nations, the top priority is to ensure human intervention is involved in AI that are applied in security-related areas. AI actually lowers the threshold of offensive military actions because of the limited casualty risk. States, including China and the United States, should cooperate on preventing the abuse of AI. According to the China Global Television Network, China is the first nation that has submitted the position paper to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for regulating the application of AI technologies in military field in December 2021.24 In other words, as with the control of nuclear weapons, norms and regulations are needed to limit the use of AI armaments. The United States is concerned about the global proliferation of unmanned systems and other AI weapons since China lacks export restrictions. China’s purposes of exporting unmanned arms, such as UAVs, include but are not limited to protecting overseas Chinese and investment security, establishing and consolidating diplomatic relations, and creating commercial profits.25 The United States is concerned about the unrestricted export for not only security reasons, but also economic ones. To prevent China from occupying the international market of unmanned systems, previous president Donald Trump reinterpreted the Missile Technology Control Regime to boost the export of UAVs. The Biden administration is willing to continue Trump’s policy, which made the export more flexible.26 Therefore, if both superpowers obtain unmanned technologies and export the arms mainly for commercial purpose, it is unnecessary for the United States to raise high concern. Future As for the future development of China’s AI technology applications in the military area: First, high-altitude long-endurance will be a primary focus of UAV development. Previous UAVs have a small carrying capacity, inadequate power supply, and little endurance, which may result in a small area of reconnaissance, failure to continuously obtain information for a long time, and even “blind spots” in intelligence, thus it is difficult for them to adapt to the needs of future warfare.

### Growth Link

#### Slowing Chinese economic growth is vital to preserving US hegemony

Mearsheimer 14 – professor of political science at University of Chicago, co-director of Program of International Security Policy at UChicago (John, “Can China Rise Peacefully,” *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* October 25th, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204)

There is a small possibility China will eventually become so powerful that the United States will not be able to contain it and prevent it from dominating Asia, even if the American military remains forward deployed in that region. China might someday have far more latent power than any of the four potential hegemons the United States confronted in the twentieth century. In terms of both population size and wealth—the building blocks of military power—neither Wilhelmine Germany, nor imperial Japan, nor Nazi Germany, nor the Soviet Union came close to matching the United States. Given that China now has more than four times as many people as the United States and is projected to have more than three times as many in 2050, Beijing would enjoy a significant advantage in latent power if it had a per capita GNI (gross national income) equivalent to that of either Hong Kong or South Korea. All that latent power would allow China to gain a decisive military advantage over its principal rivals in Asia, especially when you consider that China would be operating in its backyard, while the Unites States would be operating more than 6,000 miles from California. In that circumstance, it is difficult to see how the United States could prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. Moreover, China would probably be the more formidable superpower in the ensuing global competition with the United States. But even if China’s GNI does not rise to those levels, and it ends up with not quite as much latent power as the United States, it would still be in a good position to make a run at hegemony in Asia. All of this tells us the United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead. That outcome might not be good for American prosperity, much less for global prosperity, but it would be good for American security, which is what matters most.

### Impact – Laundry List

#### Primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments the global order and causes nuclear war.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it. Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power, norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.

The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and the revival of arms races, security dilemmas, and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could lead to great-power war, a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of nuclear weapons to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle, with all the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “regional power” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep European and extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploying military power into the Middle East? Why else would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much bolder. Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence. Chinese military forces are deploying ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “take center stage in the world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership.38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning. As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors. If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict, confrontation, and even war. The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.

The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible. Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses, with an eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

#### A receding US deterrent is a catalyst for great-power conflict — decline causes transition wars and miscalculation.

Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 7: Rediscovering Tragedy; Published by *Yale University Press*; //GrRv)

Moreover, if discussions of “international order” can quickly take on an abstract quality, the consequences of collapse—the lives lost or ruptured, the prosperity destroyed, the moral depravities committed—can be frighteningly concrete. Thucydides had it right when he described what happens in such a vacuum of security and morality: “Death thus raged in every shape … there was no length to which violence did not go.”3 This is all indisputably ~~depressing~~, but it should not be the least bit surprising. If it were possible to construct an international system that was truly universal in its appeal; if it were possible to freeze global power relationships at that moment of creation; if it were possible for states to put aside the very human ambitions, emotions, and fears that drive their behavior: then, perhaps, the world could permanently escape the competitive impulses that make international orders impermanent and their demise so traumatic. But none of this has ever been possible. International orders, even the most inclusive ones, create winners and losers because they benefit states unequally. The power balances that underpin a given system shift over time, encouraging new tests of strength. And although the human desire for peace and prosperity is strong, countries also remain motivated by ideological passion, greed, and insecurity. The most successful orders can mitigate the effects of these dynamics; they can suppress the sources of conflict and upheaval. But they cannot eliminate them entirely. This point is essential in considering the trajectory of the post-1945 order. It is tempting for individuals in nearly every geopolitical era to believe that their world is somehow different—that it is immune to the dangers of conflict and collapse. It is alluring to think that progress can be self-sustaining, and that liberal principles can triumph even if liberal actors are no longer preeminent. To do so, however, is to fall prey to the same ahistorical mindset that so predictably precedes the fall. Yes, the American order is exceptional in the level of stability, prosperity, and liberal dominance it has provided, and in the level of consent it has generated from countries around the world. Yet it is not so exceptional as to be exempt from the dangers of decline and decay. As the Greeks surely would have realized, in fact, it is precisely when one succumbs to the illusion that tragedy is impossible that tragedy becomes all the more likely. II This leads to a second component of a tragic sensibility—an appreciation that tragedy is once again stalking global affairs. The U.S.-led system is undoubtedly strong and resilient in many respects, as shown by the simple fact that it has survived as long as it has. Yet what endured in the past is not destined to endure in the future, and today the structure is groaning as the stresses mount. Long-standing principles such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation are being undermined from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea. International predators like North Korea and radical jihadist groups are using creative, asymmetric strategies to cause geopolitical disruption out of all proportion to their material power. The democratic wave has receded amid the growing prevalence and power of authoritarianism. Revisionist autocracies are reshaping regional environments in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, and waging sophisticated assaults against the political systems and geopolitical positions of their competitors. These countries are building privileged spheres of influence in critical areas of the globe; they are casting ever longer shadows, both strategic and ideological, across the international landscape. Meanwhile, the countries with the most to lose should the current system crack are too often divided and demoralized; their strategic torpor and distraction are creating vacuums that the revisionists are all too happy to fill. The protectors of the post-1945 order seem stuck in neutral, or even reverse, as the attackers push forward. This has historically been a dangerous combination. Faced with this daunting panorama, some analysts will take refuge in the hope that these challenges will simply exhaust themselves, or that revisionist powers will be satiated once their regional ambitions are fulfilled. Yet most systems tend toward more, rather than less, entropy over time, meaning that more, rather than less, energy is required to stabilize them. And revisionist powers rarely reach some natural point at which their aspirations subside; those aspirations often grow with each success.4 Today, the dissatisfied dictatorships, especially Russia and China, see themselves as being locked in a form of geopolitical conflict with the United States; they are already using force and other types of coercion to chip away at the American order. Should they succeed in claiming regional primacy and reestablishing a spheres-of-influence world, the result would be not to dampen but to inflame international conflict. Competition among the great powers would intensify as hostile spheres rub up against one another; the security of the global commons—the foundation of international prosperity—would be threatened by escalating geopolitical rivalry. The prospects for self-determination and liberalism would fade as small states fall under the sway of stronger, authoritarian neighbors. And crucially, as Daniel Twining notes, regional dominance could serve as a “springboard for global contestation”—for the renewed clashes for systemic dominance that Americans thought they had left behind with the end of the Cold War.5 It is impossible to predict precisely when the pressures on the existing order might become unbearable, or to know how close we are to that critical inflection point at which the dangers metastasize and the pace of decay dramatically accelerates. One can only speculate what the terminal crisis of the system will look like if and when it occurs. What is clear is that the telltale signs of erosion are already ubiquitous and the trend-lines are running in the wrong direction. The first step toward recovery is admitting you have a problem. Having a tragic sensibility requires seeing the world for what it is and where it is going, especially when the outlook is ominous. III If the international order is under strain, however, it does not follow that its collapse is unavoidable. Here a third aspect of a tragic sensibility is vital: the ability to reject complacency without falling into fatalism. Nietzsche defined tragic pleasure as the “reaffirmation of the will to live in the face of death.”6 It was just such a rejection of fatalism—of the belief that the next great global crackup was inevitable—that motivated U.S. policymakers to create the post-1945 order and sustain it through the crises that followed. Today, it is true enough that the grandest aspirations of the post–Cold War era are unlikely to be fulfilled anytime soon. Given the instability and revisionism roiling the international environment, it is simply beyond America’s power—if it was ever possible in the first place—to create a truly global order in which liberal values are universal, geopolitical competition has ceased, and authoritarian rivals have been fully pacified and converted into “responsible stakeholders.” Yet the existing international order, incomplete and threatened as it is, still constitutes a remarkable historical achievement. The creation of a global balance of power that favors the democracies, the prevention of unchecked aggression and intimidation by predatory powers, and the promotion of a prosperous and an integrated world in which liberal values have achieved great prevalence are all triumphs worth preserving. A more reasonable goal, then, would be to defend this existing order against the depredations of those attacking it, and America undoubtedly has the power for this essential undertaking.

### AT: China Leadership Good

#### Letting China surpass the US ensures geopolitical chaos and great-power war.

Glickman, 18 — Gabriel Glickman is a nonresident associate fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University. (2-12-2018; "Back to the Future: The Potential of Great-Power Conflict;" *National Interest*; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/back-the-future-the-potential-great-power-conflict-24464; //GrRv)

What does the DOD mean by “order?” In the field of international relations, the terms “revisionist state” and “status-quo state” are used to describe, respectively, countries that seek to change the current international system and those that uphold it. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the international system has been defined by American hegemony and the spread of Western liberal democracy rather than its challengers—notably, fascism and socialism. This is commonly referred to as the liberal world order.

Under that world order, the United States is the most powerful country in the world. It often intervenes in international conflicts at a high cost, thus keeping dissatisfied nations from overturning the system. The NDS, however, refers to a recent shift in the current world order with an observation that, “We are facing global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order.”

The basis for that observation is the argument that the United States under the Obama administration took a brief, but arguably consequential, step back from the job of world-order maintenance. As proof of this, foreign-policy pundits often refer to Obama’s favorite quote (which he got from Martin Luther King Jr., who in turn got it from a nineteenth-century clergyman named Theodore Parker): “[T]he arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” The implication of this quote is that history is ultimately on the side of good rather than evil (e.g., dictatorships), and therefore the United States needn’t concern itself with great power competition or world order strategy. Critics point out that the president’s faith in that sentiment was put to poor use, however, because it led him to apologize for American power and to enact a more restrained foreign policy that in turn allowed revisionist states like Russia, China and Iran to flourish at the expense of their respective regions’ security. As Charles Krauthammer harshly wrote in the final months of the administration: “The consequent withdrawal of American power … has yielded nothing but geopolitical chaos and immense human suffering. (See Syria.).”

And that's not exactly a partisan argument either. In addition to conservative critics like Krauthammer, left-leaning foreign policy scholars, like Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institute, also have been critical of the results of the Obama administration's well-intentioned foreign policy.

The NDS promises to reverse the “arc of history” approach to security policy with a three-tiered approach that prioritizes the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, then “rogue regimes” like Iran and North Korea, and finally “nonstate actors” such as ISIS.

Of course, this new approach may alleviate serious concerns about the NSS—including my own—that the United States government no longer cares about global security. But policy will only follow well-written sentiment if President Trump himself can accept that America is the glue holding together an entire world order.

With China now poised to reclaim its previous spot in world history as a global hegemon, the proverbial clock is turning back. And that appears to be the reason why the DOD is serious about America being in the business of world order maintenance. As stated in the NDS: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

Indeed, China already has a strong economy. It represents almost 15 percent of the global GDP to America’s roughly 24 percent. But, to put that in a slightly different perspective, China has grown astronomically in the last decade to overtake Japan as the second largest global economy. Thus, there is a real possibility that in the near future (likely decades) it may be able to surpass even the United States and then harness its capital to develop superior military technology. At that point, China would be capable of overthrowing the current international system.

The world has not seen global conflict the likes of World War I and II since the United States became the dominant power. Nor, for that matter, has it seen a recurrence of the great power conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the new defense strategy implies, take U.S. hegemony out of that equation and great powers may clash once again to the detriment of a cherished world order.

### AT: Multipolarity

#### Multipolarity fails—it generates violent fill in and risks nuclear war

Kagan 19—(Robert Kagan, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World”, Alfred A. Knopf)//ND

At the root of such thinking is the belief that there is an escape from power or that it is possible to wield power without error and without failure. Americans, blessed by their favorable geography and wealth, still believe they have a choice between engaging the world and letting the world fend for itself. There has been no shortage of realists, idealists, progressives, and conservatives telling them that substantially disengaging from our alliances and overseas commitments is possible and cost-free. But the real choice we face is not between the good and the bad but between the bad and the worse. It is between maintaining the liberal world order, with all the moral and material costs that entails, or letting it collapse and courting the catastrophes that must inevitably follow. What is likely to follow is a return to the multipolar power struggles that brought so much devastation to the world before the United States redirected the course of history. That is where the deep ruts lead, back to the state of the world prior to 1945. Only this time, the powers competing and clashing will be armed with nuclear weapons. It is ironic that some of those who spent the Cold War warning that America’s hawkish foreign policies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem “democracies would result in nuclear holocaust do not seem to fear nuclear war in the competitive multipolar world that may be our future. We have yet to test the question of whether nations with nuclear weapons can go to war, because so far the United States and the liberal world order have prevented such wars. But if history is any guide, to count on the horror of new weaponry alone to maintain the peace is a most risky bet. Had you cast that bet before the two world wars, you would have lost. These days some experts tell us it was the existence of nuclear weapons that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to blows, but few at the time had any confidence that nuclear weapons were a guarantor of peace. Throughout much of the Cold War there were those who simply assumed that the world was heading inevitably toward Armageddon. They were wrong that it would come as a result of American Cold War policies, but in the long run they may still prove right.

### China Revisionist

#### China is revisionist – territorial expansion, 5-year plans, and anti-democratic innovation on all fronts

Beckley 22 – *Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University* (Michael, March/April 2022, "Enemies of My Enemy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-02-14/china-new-world-order-enemies-my-enemy)//KH

ENTER THE DRAGON There has never been any doubt about what China wants, because Chinese leaders have declared the same objectives for decades: to keep the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, reabsorb Taiwan, control the East China and South China Seas, and return China to its rightful place as the dominant power in Asia and the most powerful country in the world. For most of the past four decades, the country took a relatively patient and peaceful approach to achieving these aims. Focused on economic growth and fearful of being shunned by the international community, China adopted a “peaceful rise” strategy, relying primarily on economic clout to advance its interests and generally following a maxim of the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your strength, bide your time.” In recent years, however, China has expanded aggressively on multiple fronts. “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy has replaced friendship diplomacy. Perceived slights from foreigners, no matter how small, are met with North Korean–style condemnation. A combative attitude has seeped into every part of China’s foreign policy, and it is confronting many countries with their gravest threat in generations. This threat is most apparent in maritime East Asia, where China is moving aggressively to cement its vast territorial claims. Beijing is churning out warships faster than any country has since World War II, and it has flooded Asian sea-lanes with Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels. It has strung military outposts across the South China Sea and dramatically increased its use of ship ramming and aerial interceptions to shove neighbors out of disputed areas. In the Taiwan Strait, Chinese military patrols, some involving a dozen warships and more than 50 combat aircraft, prowl the sea almost daily and simulate attacks on Taiwanese and U.S. targets. Chinese officials have told Western analysts that calls for an invasion of Taiwan are proliferating within the CCP. Pentagon officials worry that such an assault could be imminent. China has gone on the economic offensive, too. Its latest five-year plan calls for dominating what Chinese officials call “chokepoints”—goods and services that other countries can’t live without—and then using that dominance, plus the lure of China’s domestic market, to browbeat countries into concessions. Toward that end, China has become the dominant dispenser of overseas loans, loading up more than 150 countries with over $1 trillion of debt. It has massively subsidized strategic industries to gain a monopoly on hundreds of vital products, and it has installed the hardware for digital networks in dozens of countries. Armed with economic leverage, it has used coercion against more than a dozen countries over the last few years. In many cases, the punishment has been disproportionate to the supposed crime—for example, slapping tariffs on many of Australia’s exports after that country requested an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19. China has also become a potent antidemocratic force, selling advanced tools of tyranny around the world. By combining surveillance cameras with social media monitoring, artificial intelligence, biometrics, and speech and facial recognition technologies, the Chinese government has pioneered a system that allows dictators to watch citizens constantly and punish them instantly by blocking their access to finance, education, employment, telecommunications, or travel. The apparatus is a despot’s dream, and Chinese companies are already selling and operating aspects of it in more than 80 countries.

#### Western encirclement, aging populations, and attempted expansion prove China is a volatile revisionist power on the verge of lash-out

Beckley and Brands 21– *\*Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, associate professor at Tufts University; \*\*resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies*. (\*Michael and \*\*Hal, January 1, 2021, “Into the Danger Zone - Coming Crisis in US-China Relations," American Enterprise Institute, Targeted News Service, ProQuest via UMich Libraries, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27632?seq=1)//KH

Red Flags Most debate on America's China policy focuses on the dangers of a rising and confident China.3 But the United States actually faces a more complex and volatile threat: an already powerful but increasingly insecure China beset by internal problems and a brewing international backlash. China already has the money and muscle to challenge the United States in key areas. Thanks to decades of rapid growth, China boasts the world's largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity), manufacturing output, trade surplus, financial reserves, navy by number of ships, and conventional missile force. Chinese nationals lead four of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies.4 Chinese investments and loans span the globe, and Beijing is pushing for primacy in key technologies such as 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence (AI).5 Add in that the American-led world order has experienced four years of geopolitical disarray under President Donald Trump and that much of the world has suffered through many months of a crippling COVID-19 pandemic, and it is hardly surprising that Beijing is testing the status quo everywhere from the South China Sea to the border with China. But China's geopolitical window of opportunity may be closing as fast as it opened. Since 2007, China's annual economic growth rate has dropped by more than half, and productivity has declined by nearly 10 percent, meaning that China is spending more to produce less.6 Meanwhile, debt has ballooned eightfold and is on pace to total 335 percent of gross domestic product by the end of 2020.7 No country has racked up so much debt so fast in peacetime. China has little hope of reversing these trends, because it is about to suffer the worst aging crisis in history. Over the next 30 years, China will lose 200 million working-age adults and gain 300 million senior citizens./8 Any country that has aged, accu-mulated debt, or lost productivity at anything close to China's current pace has lost at least one decade to near-zero economic growth. And as economic growth falls, the dangers of social and political unrest rise./9 China's leaders are well aware of these trends./10 President Xi Jinping has given multiple internal speeches warning party members of the potential for a Soviet-style collapse./11 China's gov-ernment has outlawed negative economic news, and Chinese elites are moving their money and children out of the country en masse./12 Meanwhile, China faces a rising wave of foreign hostility. According to leaked Chinese government reports and independent Western analyses, nega-tive views of China have soared to highs not seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989./13 This surge of anti-China sentiment is a response to Beijing's internal repression and external assertiveness, and it is now manifesting in ways that threaten to crush China's geopolitical ambitions. Nearly a dozen countries have suspended or canceled their participation in Belt and Road Initiative projects./14 Another 16 countries, including eight of the world's 10 largest economies, have banned or severely restricted use of Huawei products in their 5G networks./15 India has been turning hard against China, since a clash between the two countries killed 20 soldiers in June. Japan has ramped up military spending, turned amphibious ships into aircraft carriers, and strung missile launchers along the Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan, where a record number of citizens now identify solely as Taiwanese, not Chinese./16 The European Union has labeled China a "systemic rival," and Europe's three great powers--France, Germany, and the United Kingdom--are sending naval patrols to counter Beijing's expansion in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean./17 These intensifying headwinds will make China a less competitive long-term rival to the United States but a more explosive **near-term threat**. Simply put, it is hard to see how a country facing so many severe challenges can ultimately outpace America and its many allies. Yet whereas a rising China could afford to shelve disputes and deescalate crises--confident that its wealth, power, and status were growing and that the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) legitimacy was secure--a slowing and increasingly encircled China will be eager to score geopolitical wins while it still can. There is no mystery about what China's ambitions are, because the CCP has enshrined them in national law: to make the Chinese nation whole again; reunite Taiwan with the mainland; control the East and South China Seas, thereby turning the western Pacific into a Chinese lake; and restore China's status as a great power. The looming danger is that China will act more aggressively to achieve them as its future prospects dim. History Rhymes If China goes down this ugly path, it wouldn't be the first great power to do so. We tend to think that rising revisionists pose the greatest danger to the existing order. "It was the rise of Athens and the **fear that this inspired in Sparta** that made war inevitable," Thucydides wrote. But historically, the most desperate dashes have often come from dissatisfied powers that had been on the ascent but grew worried that their time was running short./18 World War I is the classic example. The growing German challenge to the United Kingdom provided the strategic background to that conflict. Yet in the foreground in the run-up to 1914 were nagging German fears of decline. The growth of Russian military power and strategic mobility was menacing the eastern flank. New French conscription laws were changing the balance in the west. A tightening Franco-Russian-British entente was leaving Germany surrounded. If Berlin did not act quickly, its military strategy--based on fighting a two-front war--would collapse, its dreams of world power and geopolitical greatness would vanish, and the internal strains caused by intensifying political clashes might become unmanageable. This was a principal reason Berlin acted so recklessly during the July crisis--by issuing its "blank check" to Austria-Hungary and then enacting its plan for a rapid, two-front war--despite the obvious peril, as Chief of General Staff Helmut von Moltke acknowledged, of a continental war that might "annihilate the civilization of almost the whole of Europe for decades to come."/19 The same decision-making dynamics were present in other cases. Imperial Japan made its fatal gamble in 1941, after the US oil embargo and naval rearma-ment made it clear that Tokyo's window to dominate the Asia-Pacific was closing fast./20 In the 1970s, Soviet global expansion peaked as Moscow's military buildup matured and the slowing of the Soviet economy created an impetus to lock in geopolitical gains sooner than later. Even the United States once fit this pattern. The flurry of American expansion and the buildup of US naval power in the 1890s came after an economic slump that exacerbated internal tensions and amid a global upsurge of imperial aggran-dizement that left some US strategists concerned that Washington would be left behind by emerging European mega-empires. In some of these instances, it was economic dis-tress following a long period of growth that stoked anxious aggression. In others, it was the onset of strategic encirclement, often self-provoked, by rival powers. In all cases, an upsurge in a revisionist state's power gave it the means to challenge the status quo, but an apparent downturn in its future prospects gave it the motive to do so boldly, even violently. Given that China is currently facing both a grim economic forecast and tightening strategic encirclement, the next few years may prove partic-ularly turbulent./21

## Russia Alliance Impact Answers

### Impossible

#### China will never create a full alliance with Russia because it needs US markets to sustain growth

Brækhus and Øverland 07 — Kyrre Elvenes Brækhus and Indra Øverland, Brækhus is a Mandarin Language Scholar at Tsinghua University, Beijing, Øverland is Director of the Energy Program at Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 2007 (“A Match Made in Heaven? Strategic Convergence between China and Russia”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, May 2007, Available Online at <http://old.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/May_2007/Braekhus_Overland.pdf>, Accessed 07-05-2016, SP)

Institutionalization of the Beijing–Moscow relationship remains low, but a pattern of regular consultation between top leaders has evolved. Russia and China also meet annually for bilateral military and technical co-operation talks, and have continued to develop the Shanghai Cooperation Organization founded in 2001. China–Russia strategic convergence is a discernible trend which will gain further momentum. However, strategic convergence should not be confused with an alliance, and China and Russia are not perfect strategic partners. Developments inside China and Russia are crucial to how the relationship develops. Key questions are whether political stability will prevail and whether rapid growth can be sustained. Trenin argues that a Sino–Russian alliance could occur only as a result of “exceptionally short-sighted and foolish policies on China and Russia are not pro-Western, but neither are they definitively anti-Western. Western policymakers who are worried about the implications of Sino–Russian strategic convergence would do well to pursue a policy of engaging both Moscow and Beijing, and put pressure on Tokyo to resolve the dispute over the Kurile Islands. Paradoxically, if an alliance, or something resembling an alliance, were to be formed this could lead to a breakdown of the relationship in the medium to long term. China and Russia both command sufficient resources and sophistication to be significant global powers in their own right, and they certainly consider themselves as such. China was unwilling to subordinate itself to Russia for more than a brief period after the Communists came to power in 1949, and Russia would refuse to subordinate itself to China. The most likely scenario is Sino–Russo strategic convergence based on a relationship of mutual self-interest. The evidence presented in this article indicates that trade and investment between China and Russia are set to continue to grow rapidly, particularly in the energy sector, further enhancing the significance of the relationship. While Beijing and Moscow have common interests in placing restraints on the power of the United States, the creation of a full-fledged anti-Western alliance is unlikely to prove viable in the short term. Russia and especially China are both dependent on open access to Western markets to sustain growth.

### Inevitable

#### China will support Russia regardless of how the Ukraine conflict develops

Blanchette 22(Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman chair in China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him,” The Washington Post, March 24, 2022 at 4:09 p.m. EDT, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/24/xi-jinping-putin-china-russia-sanctions/>) - MP

China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime. Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen. To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean. This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.” Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power. Time is running out for China The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.” Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ” The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment. Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned. But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow. Succession plans protect nations. Putin and Xi just threw theirs out. Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner. If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.

### Russia-China Good Turn

#### Russia-Chinese alliance key to prevent border conflicts – without dialogue, the tensions would mirror the sino-soviet border wars

Crossley 2/27 [Pamela Kyle Crossley - Collis Professor of History, Dartmouth College, "Are China and Russia Forging a New Ideological Bloc?", https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/are-china-and-russia-forging-new-ideological-bloc, DOA: 6/25/16]

Ambassador Wu's reference to the absurdity of an "ideological bloc" is interesting, and in the sense of “ideology” as sometimes used in policy circles the prospect does seem absurd. But there has been some convergence of strategic conceptualization between the sequence of governments based in Beijing and in Moscow since at least 1689, when they began their own history of diplomatic exchange, and since that time they have successfully negotiated the maintenance of their nearly 3,000 miles of shared borders. It has not been simple or uniformly peaceful, and the idea that two enormous countries sharing centuries of successfully resolved tensions between their ancestral empires without emerging with some common ideas about trade regulation and taxation, environmental management, migration controls and maintenance of security is not entirely credible. Those could amount to an ideology of a positive sort, as contrasted to mere suspicion of and opposition to the United States, a sort of negative ideology. There are clearly grounds for alliance between Russia and China based on stable shared perspectives and interests rather than only a shared opponent. The question of China’s dense population accumulation on one side of the border and Russia’s expanses of lightly inhabited and under-developed territory on the other presents as many possibilities for cooperation as for conflict. The same is true for the faltering of the regime in North Korea, the problems of resource exploitation and transport in Central Asia, the management of sea and air dominance of the western Pacific, the development of programs for exploitation of space and the moon, and financial and commercial initiatives in Europe, among other issues. Russia and China have every reason to explore mutually-disciplined expansion on all fronts at the expense, if possible, of the United States and Japan, and history suggests that the rewards are great enough that both parties will have reason to accept such a program. The possibility of disenchantment on either side will always be present. Each can cite grievances against the other if needed, from the First United Front to the Korean War to the Sino-Soviet split to border disputes. The greatest danger may come not from the complexities of their roles in the wider world but from the relative stabilities of their governments. Slippage by either would raise the question of support from the other, or exploitation of a crisis to in order to sponsor a new and perhaps dependent —or at least obliged— new regime. Their pasts, in other words, look a bit more solid than their futures. Where they seek friendship they could find betrayal. But their history suggests that whether empires or republics they have an underlying understanding of what it is to be expansive on the Asian continent, to be enemies of Japan, and to live in tension with whatever they mean by “the West.” Why they would need “ideology” to further consolidate their affinity is not clear, but realization of what they have in common could be an ideology in itself.

#### Another sino-soviet border dispute causes nuclear war – US gets drawn in when Russia or china attack each other

Bolton 10 [Kerry R Bolton, "Sino-Soviet-US Relations and the 1969 Nuclear Threat", www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/17/sino-soviet-us-relations-and-the-1969-nuclear-threat/, DOA: 6/25/16]

The mainstream press has just come out with a Chinese expose that has informed an undoubtedly surprised world that in 1969 the USSR wished to settle its historical score with China and launch a nuclear attack. The USSR merely wanted an assurance of U.S. neutrality. Far from the USA welcoming this de-clawing of the growing dragon, it instead threatened that there would be retaliation from the U.S. against Russia. According to a report first carried in the Daily Telegraph, Chinese historian Liu Chenshan, writing in an officially sanctioned newspaper, stated that the threat “came in 1969 at the height of a bitter border dispute between Moscow and Beijing that left more than one thousand people dead on both sides.” [1] Liu quotes Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin as stating to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on October 15 that “Washington has drawn up ‘detailed plans’ for a nuclear war against the USSR if it attacked China.” The Telegraph writers also speculate that Liu is likely to have had access to official archives given the appearance of this as part of a series of six articles in an official news source. The Telegraph article continues: “The historian claims that Washington saw the USSR as a greater threat than China and wanted a strong China to counter-balance Soviet power…” They also conclude: “Mr Liu, the author, admits his version of history is likely to be contested by rival scholars.” However, this Chinese revelation is not “new” to informed observers. The Russian desire to settle with China, despite the cynically named Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance that had been signed between Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin in 1950 – which relegated China to colonial status rather than pave the way to super-power status[2] – came amidst the culmination of border disputes that had been ongoing since 1960.[3] The largest conflict had taken place on March 2, 1969, when Chinese troops ambushed Russian troops on the uninhabited Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, killing 32 Russians. The Soviets responded on the night of March 14 by shelling 20 kilometers into China. Approximately 60 Russians and 800 Chinese were killed in the conflict. So extensive was the Russian attack that Mao feared a Soviet invasion. It was then that the USSR intended to drive home their offensive with a nuclear attack. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in their book Mao: The Unknown Story, allude to an article at the time published in a London newspaper “by a KGB-linked Russian journalist Victor Louis”, who had been Russian emissary to Taiwan, stating that the Kremlin was discussing bombing China’s nuclear test site, and planning to set up an “alterative leadership” for the Chinese Communist party.[4] Moreover it was U.S. President Richard Nixon’s aide John Haldeman who seems to have first broken the nuclear attack story in his memoirs in 1978.[5] He stated that for years the USSR had been trying to warn the USA not to allow China to become a nuclear power. This claim by Haldeman seems to directly contradict the claim by Liu that Nixon, when responding to the 1969 Soviet request for neutrality, did so not only because he regarded China as a means of containing Russia, but also because he was still “smarting from a Soviet refusal five years earlier to stage a joint attack on China’s nascent nuclear programme.”[6] If we place this all into context, I believe that the 1978 Haldeman version is more likely than that of Liu’s present contention. If the USA had asked for support from the USSR to bomb China’s nuclear programme in 1964, this was a year following Sino-Russian border conflicts amounting to 4000 dead. In 1960, there had been 400 clashes; in 1962, 5000.[7] The USSR would have no sentimental, comradely, ideological, diplomatic, or geo-political reasons to oppose such a US proposal and then change her mind five years later and make a similar suggestion to the USA. The relationship between China, the USA, and the USSR is quite contrary to how it is generally perceived. A more accurate scenario is that the USA backed Mao and the USSR backed Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin, prior to Mao’s assumption to power, regarded him as a Trotskyite. While Stalin had previously backed Mao as a counter to a Trotskyite coterie in China headed by Prof. Chen Tu-hsiu, Mao’s onetime mentor, by 1938,[8] Mao was being denounced in the USSR as a Trotskyite.[9] During World War II, while the USA was pushing Chiang to make an alliance with Mao against the Japanese, Stalin was counselling Chiang against this.[10] Gen. George Marshall warned Chiang in 1946 at a crucial time that if he persisted in pursuing the beleaguered Red Army into Northern Manchuria, U.S. aid would stop. This provided Mao with a base from which to recuperate and finally defeat Chiang. On the other hand, Stalin’s aid to Mao was granted according to Russian interests as distinct from communist fraternity, one particularly dramatic example of which was the demand for repayment in food that resulted in 10,000 peasants dying of starvation in Yenan.[11] This was a prelude to the debilitating Sino-Soviet Treaty that was to result in the “Great Famine” for the same reason.[12] Mao thought that he could make China a great power on Stalin’s coat tails. This was a grave error. While the USA attempted to court China, Mao went out of his way to act “Bolshie” towards the “Paper Tiger,” in a futile effort to court Stalin. Chang and Halliday write: “It was widely thought that it was the U.S. that refused to recognize Mao’s China. In fact, Mao went out of his way to make recognition impossible by engaging in overtly hostile acts.”[13] In 1979, the year for the renewal of the 1950 “friendship treaty” between Russia and China, Mao gestured as to what he by then thought the fraternal relationship by invading Russia’s ally Vietnam, which was particularly significant in that in 1978 the USSR had entered into a 25 year defence treaty with Vietnam.[14] Given the historically strained (at best) relationship between China and Russia, even at a time when they were supposed to be ideologically aligned, what are likely future scenarios on the world stage? There seems to be a preponderant view that the USA and China will increasingly become rivals due to economical and raw material factors. There is also a view that the USA and Russia will align against China. Again turning to an article in the Daily Telegraph, there is an interesting item from 2009. This refers to the Russian ethnic population decline in the Russian Far East, in comparison to the burgeoning Chinese population across the border, coupled with the tremendous mineral resources of the area. David Blair writes: The endless silver birch forests of the Russian Far East might appear so desolate and windswept that no one could possibly be interested in them. Yet the vast swath of territory between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok may become a new theatre of confrontation between Russia and China in the decades ahead. For now, the two giant neighbours have been thrust together by their shared suspicion of America and they cooperate as tactical allies, working in the United Nations Security Council to contain Washington’s power. But this affinity is based on little more than having the same rival. The empty lands of the Russian Far East, far closer to Beijing than Moscow, contain major sources of tension between the two powers.

#### China has an incentive to attack the Russia border

Sharavin 4 [Alexander, director of the Political and Military Analysis Institute, What the Papers Say, Jan 14]

Question: In your view, who poses the greatest danger to Russia? Alexander Sharavin: In the Defense Ministry's latest report, known as the White Book, our likely opponents are not named - they remain anonymous. However, we believe in being specific. And we name China first. At present, China appears to have good neighborly relations with Russia, and constantly declares that its intentions are friendly; but some of its actual actions prompt the thought that not everything is quite that simple. For example, the state borders issue hasn't been fully resolved - and such matters are always time-bombs. The Russian media pays a lot of attention to the territory dispute with Japan over four small islands, but it totally ignores China's pretensions, even though China aspires to claim much more territory - virtually all of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Or rather, official Beijing remains silent, but articles do appear in China's newspapers sometimes, and discontented voices are raised. It's hard to believe that anyone could permit themselves to speak out like that without authorization in totalitarian China. I repeat: there is no threat from China in the short term - Beijing's policies are entirely loyal in relation to us at present. But what might happen ten years from now? What guarantee is there that somebody won't try to play the territory card? Question: And we're selling Beijing modern fighter jets with extra engines. Alexander Sharavin: Yes, that's an alarming point. So it seems China is allowing for the possibility that the situation might change, and Russia might stop supplying spare parts for military hardware to its neighbor? And is it any coincidence that China's strongest military forces are concentrated along our borders, even if they're at a distance of 200 kilometers? Is that any distance at all, to them? And let's not forget that on our side of the border there are regions with depressed economies, with vast natural resources and small, ever-shrinking populations.

#### That causes extinction

Sharavin 1 [Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3]

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.